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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court's review of legislative facts found by 
Congress can make all the difference between enjoying a consti-
tutional right and losing it. The Court's recent decision in Gon-
zales v. Carhart1 powerfully illustrates this point. There the 
Court in an opinion by Justice Kennedy held that women did not 
possess a right to a "partial birth" abortion, although six years 
previously in Stenberg v. Carhad the Court held the opposite. 
According to Justice Kennedy, one of the two key differences 
between the current and prior case was that in Gonzales Con-
gress had found that the practice was a "gruesome and inhuman 
procedure that is never medically necessary."' 
The opinion, however, also underscores the peculiar and 
radically under-theorized nature of the treatment accorded con-
gressional fact-finding. Justice Kennedy admitted that several of 
Congress' other findings about partial-birth abortions were fac-
tually incorrect.4 The patent infirmity of many of Congress' fact 
assessments on the very subject under consideration raises obvi-
ous questions about why the Court should be influenced by any 
of Congress' other findings. 
Second, the Court actually did not defer to the Congress' 
strong conclusion that partial-birth abortions were never medi-
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cally necessary, but to the weaker implicit claim that it was at 
least uncertain whether partial-birth abortions were ever medi-
cally necessary.' The Court argued that this weak claim was all 
that was necessary to sustain the facial constitutionality of the 
statute because Congress should have the discretion to regulate 
abortion under conditions of medical uncertainty." Thus, the 
Court reconstructed Congress' fact-finding before giving it 
weight. 
Moreover, the opinion provides completely unconvincing 
support for its stance toward congressional fact-finding. Justice 
Kennedy cites precisely one case in his discussion of why the 
Court should give weight to congressional fact-findings but not 
simply accept them. The case is Crowell v. Benson, 7 a famous 
administrative law decision from seventy-seven years ago in 
which the Court considered the question of how to scrutinize 
facts for ascertaining that work had taken place in navigable wa-
ters-a premise that was necessary to establish that federal ju-
risdiction over the workmen's compensation claim was constitu-
tional.~ But in the relevant portion of that case the Crowell Court 
was reviewing an administrative agency's fact-finding, not Con-
gress'.y Moreover, the Court held that the findings necessary to 
establish the constitutional authority to extend federal jurisdic-
tion were subject to the federal judiciary's de novo review, not a 
review with any degree of deference. 10 The current Court's cita-
tion of such a manifestly inapposite case highlights that it still 
has no coherent theory of the judicial role in cases where Con-
gress has found social facts to support to the constitutionality of 
its legislation. 
This article responds to the Court's confusion about fact-
finding in the partial-birth abortion case by offering a compre-
hensive view of how the Court should treat legislative views of 
social facts, such as the medical need for partial-birth abortions, 
which provide an essential foundation for the constitutionality of 
5. !d. at 1636. 
6. /d. at 1636-37. 
7. /d. at 1637 (citing Crowell v. Benson. 285 U.S. 22 (1932)). 
8. Crowell. 285 U.S. at 53-55. 
9. /d. at 60--61. 
10. /d. at 45-46. 64--65. The Court stated that "we review congressional factfinding 
under a deferential standard'' but then quoted Crowell for the proposition that "(i]n 
cases brought to enforce constitutional rights. the judicial power of the United States 
necessarily extends to the independent determination of all questions. both of fact and 
law. necessary to the performance of th(e] supreme function (of enforcing constitutional 
rights]." Carhart. 127 S. Ct. at 1637 (quoting Crowell. 285 U.S. at 60). 
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legislation. We reject the notion, which the Court often but in-
consistently deploys, that the judiciary should treat legislative 
views of the facts more deferentially than legislative views of the 
law. 
Displacing the judiciary from an independent, de novo fact-
finding role must depend either on the argument that law is in-
herently different from fact or that Congress has a greater com-
parative advantage vis-a-vis the judiciary in finding social facts 
than in assessing the law. Neither is supportable. There is no 
analytic dichotomy between law and fact. Law is a social fact, 
just as are the data or statistical analysis that may be relevant to 
questions such as whether partial abortions are ever medically 
necessary. 
Thus, the key question about whether the judiciary should 
defer to Congress' fact-finding or rely on its own assessment of 
social facts is functional. If Congress had a superior ability to 
find facts, deference might make sense. But we show that Con-
gress' fact-finding abilities are less capacious and more biased 
than those in the judiciary. As an elected body, Congress is de-
signed to respond to its constituents' subjective desires, not to 
the objective facts of the world. In contrast, the judiciary is insu-
lated from the preferences of constituents and less subject to 
partisan bias. Its salient institutional structure is the adversarial 
proceeding where each side has incentives to scrutinize relent-
lessly the factual claims of its opponent. Accordingly, the judici-
ary would appear to be a superior fact-finder both because of its 
institutional capacity and because of its relative lack of bias. 
In arguing for independent judicial evaluation of facts nec-
essary to assess legislation's constitutionality, we do not suggest 
that the Court should sit in oversight of the record of Congress' 
fact-finding. It may well create tension with the separation of 
powers for the judiciary to sift through facts Congress has found. 
But it does not follow that a judiciary that declines to sit in judg-
ment on the internal work product of a coordinate branch 
should not compile its own factual record to test the constitu-
tionality of a statute. 
Indeed, the separation of powers supports a de novo judicial 
role in fact-finding. It is now well established that each branch of 
government has the responsibility to measure the text of legisla-
tion against the Constitution. By similar logic, each branch has 
the obligation to determine whether facts support the constitu-
tionality of legislation. For instance, if the constitutionality of 
partial-birth abortion turns on the question of whether partial-
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birth abortions are ever medically necessary, each branch should 
make this determination for itself. Just as the departmental ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation safeguards the rights and 
structures of the Constitution by subjecting the constitutionality 
of legislation to multiple scrutiny in legal interpretation, so too 
does a departmental approach to constitutional fact-finding. 
One reason the Court has been so inconsistent in taking re-
sponsibility for fact-finding is that it has never laid out proce-
dures for doing so. Successful procedures require transparency 
and the right of all parties to be heard in an adversary process 
because these are the characteristics of judicial fact-finding that 
increase the capacity for accuracy and decrease the risk of bias. 
Our article proceeds in four parts. Part I considers the Su-
preme Court's treatment of legislative or social facts that pro-
vide a necessary predicate to the constitutionality of legislation. 
We first show how these social facts differ from the adjudicative 
facts. Second, this section shows that the Court's implicit or ex-
plicit determination of social facts has been essential to many 
well known holdings. Third. we show that the Court has been in-
consistent and result oriented in its approach to social fact-
finding. Even within the same area of law, such as the First 
Amendment, the Court has sometimes deferred to Congress and 
sometimes has not. It has sometimes relied on a lower court re-
cord of facts entered into evidence, but sometimes it has taken 
"judicial notice" of controversial facts for itself. 
In Part II, we review scholarly treatments of the judiciary's 
role in finding social facts. Unfortunately, most previous scholars 
have failed to provide a useful framework of analysis. First, 
many tend to complain about the Court's deference to congres-
sional fact-finding or lack thereof in a particular area of law, like 
the recent federalism cases. In our view, this focus confuses the 
specific question of whether judicial scrutiny of the legal area is 
appropriate with the general question of whether judicial scru-
tiny of social facts is appropriate. Second, other scholars have 
recently attacked the Court for reviewing the record of fact-
finding compiled by Congress. We agree with this criticism, but 
do not believe it shows that the Court should not be engaged in 
it own fact-finding. We also briefly distinguish our analysis from 
that of other scholars, such as Richard Posner, who argue that 
legal doctrine should depend more on analysis of social facts 
than formal rules. Our point is more limited: whenever legal 
doctrine requires the analysis of social facts, the judiciary should 
analyze the social facts for itself de novo. 
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In Part Ill, which is the heart of our analysis, we show that 
the legislature has no advantage in social fact-finding compared 
to the judiciary. First, we demonstrate that there is no sharp ana-
lytical difference between legal interpretation and social fact-
finding. Second, we offer two kinds of analysis that suggest that 
the courts are at least as competent as Congress in finding facts. 
The first analysis, drawn from public choice theory, regards 
members of Congress as interested primarily in reelection. As a 
result, they will tend to focus more on the preferences of con-
stituents rather than objective facts. We also broaden the tradi-
tional focus of public choice to consider the incentives of the 
public at large. We show these incentives will also undermine the 
accuracy of congressional fact-finding, because the public ex-
pects Congress to find the facts that support its preferences, 
rather than the actual facts. Our second analysis relaxes the pub-
lic choice view and permits members of Congress a substantial 
independent interest in the accuracy of the facts. Nevertheless, 
because of cognitive biases, such as the confirmation bias and 
the availability heuristic, Congress remains less likely to find 
facts accurately than is the judiciary with its more disciplined, 
adversarial methods. 
Finally, we show that the increasing consensus on depart-
mentalism- the notion that each branch should independently 
interpret the Constitution- also strongly supports an independ-
ent role for judicial fact-finding. While departmentalism has re-
cently emphasized that the legislature and executive are inde-
pendently charged with legal interpretation and should not yield 
that responsibility to the Court, departmentalism similarly shows 
that that the Court has a de novo role in fact-finding which it 
should not yield to the legislature or the executive. 
In Part IV, we argue that, regardless of whether Congress 
has found social facts, the judiciary must create a transparent 
and adversarial process of social fact-finding for itself, because it 
is those qualities that provide its comparative advantage in its 
sphere. Thus, the lower courts should determine what facts are 
relevant to the constitutionality of a statute and compile a record 
on those facts. In this way, parties will have notice and be able to 
bring to bear the best and most relevant evidence. The Supreme 
Court should limit its factual determinations to this record and 
not be swayed by last minute proffers of facts that have not been 
subjected to an adversarial process. 
74 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 25:69 
I. CONGRESSIONAL FACT-FINDING IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
In this section, we set the stage for our own analysis of how 
the Supreme Court should act in cases involving congressional 
fact-finding by briefly reviewing its past performance. The 
Court's treatment of congressional fact-finding has been marked 
by three kinds of substantive inconsistencies. First, it has been 
inconsistent in its standard of deference to those findings. Some-
times it defers and sometimes it does not, even in the same areas 
of the law, raising questions about whether it simply makes up 
its mind as to whether it agrees with Congress and then fabri-
cates a standard of review. Second, the Court is inconsistent in 
deciding whether its review of facts is limited to facts found by 
Congress on a record or whether these facts can be supple-
mented by other evidence supporting the constitutionality of the 
statute that was not relied upon by Congress. Third, the Su-
preme Court is also inconsistent in sometimes relying on a fac-
tual record laid out by lower courts and yet at other times rely-
ing on facts offered by amici or of its own devise-facts that 
have never been subject to any adversarial process. The ap-
proach we suggest in Part IV would eliminate these inconsisten-
cies by requiring the judiciary to do its own fact-finding and the 
Supreme Court to confine itself to the factual record created by 
lower courts. It would prevent ad hoc claims of deference from 
substituting for the Court's own reasoned analysis of the factual 
predicate of legislation. 
To pinpoint the kind of fact-finding with which this article is 
concerned we also briefly describe the difference between adju-
dicative facts on the one hand and legislative or social facts on 
the other. We then discuss those cases where the Supreme 
Court's own doctrine makes the existence of social facts disposi-
tive of the constitutionality of legislation. Our principal concern 
in this article is with a subset of those cases- those in which the 
legislature, generally Congress, has itself found that the relevant 
social facts support the constitutionality of the statute.11 
11. While this is our principal concern, our recommendations for procedural rules 
for judicial finding of social facts are applicable to all judicial fact-finding. regardless of 
whether Congress has expressly found facts. 
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A. LEGISLATIVE FACTS AND ADJUDICATIVE FACTS 
Legislative facts are best understood by comparing them to 
adjudicative facts. Adjudicative facts cover "what the parties did, 
what the circumstances were, [and] what the background condi-
tions were." 12 Legislative facts, in contrast, are facts that are less 
partic_ular to the_ parties, ?ut rather "are gen~ral facts _whic~ he,~B 
the tnbunal decide questiOns of law and pohcy and discretiOn. · 
While no bright line distinction exists between legislative and 
adjudicative facts, the former tend to "relate legislative policy to 
the purported constitutional authorization of a statute. "14 Legis-
lative facts "transcend individual disputes and would likely recur 
in different cases involving similar subjects." 15 
Legislative facts are often salient to employing balancing 
tests/6 strict scrutiny/7 determining what constitutes an en-
dorsement of religion,18 whether there is a national consensus 
that the juvenile death penalty is cruel and unusual, 19 whether a 
six-member jury functions in the same way as a twelve-member 
jury,20 and in the many other doctrines the Supreme Court util-
izes to "say what the law is. "21 Indeed, since the Supreme Court 
takes cases in order to formulate law rather than solely to adju-
dicate particular cases, legislative facts often drive its opinions 
much more than adjudicative facts. 
12. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administra-
tive Process. 55 HARV. L. REV. 364,402 (1942). 
13. David Faigman. Fact-Finding in Constitutional Cases. in How LAW KNOWS 162 
(Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2007) (quoting KENNETH CULP DAVIS. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TEXT§ 7.03, at 160 (3rd ed. 1972)). 
14. PAUL ROSEN. THE SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 53 (1972): see {,[so 
Ann Woolhandler. Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts. 41 VAND. L. 
REV. 111. 114 (1988) ("The key difference between adjudicative and legislative facts is 
not the characteristics of particular versus general facts. but rather. evidence whose proof 
has a more established place and more predictable effect within a framework of estab-
lished legal rules as distinct from evidence that is more manifestly designed to create the 
rules."). 
15. Faigman, supra note 13, at 162. 
16. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff. Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing. 96 
YALE L.J. 943 ( 1987). 
17. Adarand Constructors. Inc. v. Pena. 515 U.S. 200. 236 (1995) (remanding to 
lower court to apply strict scrutiny to race-based classifications in federal statute). 
18. Board of Ed. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226.250-51 (1990) (declining to second guess 
congressional judgment that "secondary school students are mature enough and are 
likely to understand that a school does not endorse or support student speech that it 
merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis"). 
19. Roper v. Simmons. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
20. Williams v. Florida. 399 U.S. 78 (1970): Colgrove v. Battin. 413 U.S. 149 (1973). 
21. Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137. 177 (1803). 
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Many of the Court's judicial opinions reviewing congres-
sional legislation do not address the issue of congressional fact-
finding simply because Congress had made no such findings in 
connection with the law at issue. But if one believes that Con-
gress takes the Constitution seriously, then Congress implicitly 
finds facts whenever a set of facts are necessary to the constitu-
tionality of a law, since in passing the law, Congress is making a 
determination that the law is constitutional. When the Court 
strikes down a congressional law, it likewise makes an explicit or 
implicit determination that Congress got the facts wrong. To 
provide a well known example, "separate educational facilities 
are inherently unequal" was the law set forth in Brown v. Board 
of Education.22 It was also a legislative fact found by the Court. 
On the same day as Brown, the Court applied this rule to the 
federal government via the Fifth Amendment in Bolling v. 
Sharpe. 23 A necessary implication of that opinion is that the 
Court did not consider Congress to be the superior fact-finder 
on the question of whether segregation in the Washington, D.C. 
schools generated such a feeling of inferiority in black students 
to the point of being inherently unequal.24 One way of focusing 
our inquiry is to ask whether the Court should have acted any 
differently had Congress assembled a record of factual findings 
supporting the constitutionality of the segregated D.C. public 
schools. 
B. INCONSISTENCIES IN STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When the factual assumptions of Congress are more explicit 
the Court has been unable to formulate a consistent approach 
towards Congress' fact-finding. 25 Sometimes the Court explicitly 
22. 347U.S.483.495(1954). 
23. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
24. The losing side of Brown took this position, arguing: "Whatever the empirical 
truth of the matter ... the courts were not the proper forums for determining these facts. 
These matters were more properly decided by state legislatures and educational authori-
ties." DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LABORATORY OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT'S 200-
YEAR STRUGGLE TO INTEGRATE SCIENCE AND THE LAW 189 (2004 ). 
25. The Court's uncertainty on how it reviews Congress is exemplified by Justice 
Steven's question to Solicitor General Clement in the oral argument in Gonaza/es v. 
Carhart. Justice Stevens asked "is there a different standard of review of what the district 
court found as opposed to what Congress found?" Oral Argument for Gonzales v. 
Carhart at 11 (No. 05-380) (Nov. 8. 2006). The Solicitor General responded that "if you 
have situations, which you have in this case. where the district court heard some of the 
same witnesses who testified before Congress and before the district court. and the dis-
trict court makes a different credibility finding than the Congress. I don't think that's a 
basis for the district court to overcome the contrary findings of Congress." !d. 
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defers to the facts found by Congress, sometimes it makes an in-
dependent judgment of the facts, and sometimes it engages in a 
combination of these approaches. 
Even on one specific issue, such as whether the danger of 
Communism is significant enough to warrant restrictions on First 
Amendment rights, the Court has been inconsistent on its defer-
ence to congressional findings. For example, in Dennis v. United 
States, the Court deferred to Congress' finding that members of 
the Communist Party of the United States posed a sufficient 
threat to national security to be convicted under the Smith Act. 26 
After citing hearings before the House Committee on Un-
American Activities, Justice Frankfurter in his concurrence con-
cluded that it was not the Court's position to replace a judgment 
Congress had made with "due deliberation." 27 
Sixteen years later, however, in United States v. Robel, the 
Court struck down a provision of the Subversive Activities Con-
trol Act which barred any member of a communist organization 
from working at a defense facility. 28 The statute at issue was 
found to be an overbroad impediment to freedom of association 
rights. The Court found that "[a] number of complex motiva-
tions may impel an individual to align himself with a particular 
organization," so membership in a communist organization was 
"insufficient to impute to him the organization's illegal goals."29 
Justices Harlan and White both dissented, maintaining that 
the Court had wrongly "arrogate[d] to itself an independent 
judgment of the requirements of national security."3{1 The dis-
senters argued that Congress passed the statute after years of in-
vestigation into communism, which led to fact-findings of an in-
ternational conspiracy with thousands of adherents in the United 
States intent on employing "treachery, deceit, espionage, and 
sabotage" to overthrow the government of the United States.31 
The Robel Court simply declined to provide Congress with the 
same. de!erence that the J?e'!ni~ Co~rt ~,rovided on the politically 
volatile Issue of commumst mfiltratwn.-
26. 341 U.S.494(1951). 
27. /d. at 547 (Frankfurter. concurring). 
28. 389 u.s. 258 (1967). 
29. /d. at 266 n.16. 
30. /d. at 289. 
31. /d. at 285-86. 
32. See Richard A. Posner. Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in First Amendment 
Analysis. 54 STAN. L. REV. 737. 741 (2002) (""Hence. when the country feels very safe the 
Justices of the Supreme Court can without paying a large political cost plume themselves 
on their fearless devotion to freedom of speech""). For another example of the Court's 
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There are more recent examples of inconsistent standards 
of deference in analyzing social facts dispositive to individual 
rights. In Board of Ed. v. Mergens, the Court upheld the Equal 
Access Act, which prohibits secondary schools from denying re-
ligious student groups equal access to school facilities. 33 Before 
enacting the law, Congress found that secondary students would 
be able to distinguish student expression of religious speech 
from state endorsements of religion.}.! After citing the Senate re-
ports on the topic, the Court added, "we do not lightly second-
guess such legislative judgments, particularly where the judg-
ments are based in part on empirical determinations."3' 
In other recent instances, however, the Court has ignored 
Congressional findings altogether. In Dickerson v. Unites States, 
the Court was faced with the question of whether the Miranda 
rule could be supplanted by congressional statute. 3" In Miranda 
v. Arizona the Court announced the warnings that are required 
if confessions are to be deemed voluntary, and therefore admis-
sible into evidence.37 The Miranda Court made extensive find-
ings about the "nature and setting" of in-custody interrogation, 
including a survey of police manuals from around the country.3" 
The Miranda opinion acknowledged that the appropriate way to 
enforce the privilege against self-incrimination was dependant 
on legislative facts, and even invited legislative alternatives to 
the newly announced rule.39 Two years after Miranda, Congress 
inconsistency in the First Amendment area, see Archibald Cox. Foreward: Freedom of 
Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1. 31 (1980) (contrasting Landmark 
Communications v. Virginia. 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978). which held that '"deference to a 
legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights are at 
stake" with Columbia Broadcasting Sys .. Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.. 412 U.S. 94 
(1973 ). which relied heavily on facts found by Congress in permitting a broadcast licen-
see to adopt a blanket rule refusing to sell time for spots on public issues). 
33. Mergens. 496 U.S. 226 (1990). 
34. !d. at 250-51. 
35. !d. at 251. Similarly, in United States v. Lee. 455 U.S. 252 (1982), the Court up-
held the government's imposition of social security taxes against an Amish litigant who 
objected on religious grounds. The Court deferred to Congress' judgment that "'manda-
tory participation is indispensable to the fiscal vitality of the social security system ... !d. 
at 258. 
36. 530 u.s. 428 (2000). 
37. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
38. !d. at 445-58. 
39. !d. at 467 ("It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for pro-
tecting the privilege which might be devised by Congress or the States in the exercise of 
their creati\'e rule-making capacities. Therefore we cannot say that the Constitution nec-
essarily requires adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the 
interrogation process .... We encourage Congress and the States to continue their laud-
able search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual while 
promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws"). 
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enacted a rule that confessions would be admissible in federal 
prosecutions so long as they were voluntarily made, even if 
Miranda warnings had not been given.-10 Congress made exten-
sive factual findings in the legislative record to support the con-
stitutionality of this legislation.41 When the law was eventually 
challenged in Dickerson, the Court received briefs emphasizing 
the factual findings that Congress relied on when it enacted the 
congressional statute,42 but the Court did not even address, let 
alone defer, to these findings in its opinion.4' It simply held that 
the remedies Congress offered were not sufficient to reduce the 
risk of coerced confession.44 
The Court's tendency to employ different standards of re-
view towards congressional fact-finding not only undermines the 
candor of its opinions but the accuracy of its own fact-finding. 
Because the Court is able to simply defer to Congress when it 
agrees with the factual predicate for its statute, it does not have 
to provide a more formal accounting of what factual support the 
statute actually enjoys. Our framework of de novo review of the 
facts necessary to support the constitutionality of a statute would 
thus not only provide greater consistency but promote greater 
accuracy as the Court became more rigorous about social fact-
finding.4' 
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3501. The standard set out by this statute was similar to the ··totality 
of the circumstances·· test the Court had created before Miranda to determine whethe.r 
confessions were voluntarily made. Dickerson. 530 U.S. at 434. 442-43. 
41. SeeS. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968) reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112. at 2127-38. 
42. See Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Urging Affirmance of the Judg-
ment Below. at 26-27. Dickerson v. United States. 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No. 99-5525) (cit-
ing Senate Report finding that "the rigid and inflexible requirements of the majority 
opinion in the Miranda case are ... extremely harmful to law enforcement."). Other 
briefs emphasized the congressional findings. and the deference these findings were 
owed under Supreme Court precedent. See Amicus Curaie Brief of the Bipartisan Legal 
Advisory Group of the United States House of Representatives in Support of Affir-
mance. at 19-20 Dickerson v. United States. 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No. 99-5525) (stating 
that Congress' fact-findings were entitled to deference): Brief Amicus Curaie of Senators 
Orrin G. Hatch. et a!.. Urging Affirmance. at 13. Dickerson v. United States. 530 U.S. 
428 (2000) (No. 99-5525) (stating that "according to congressional findings. the basis for 
Miranda's conclusive presumption is incorrect as an empirical matter"). 
43. The Court briefly touched on the factual issue. but not the findings themselves. 
by stating: "we agree with the amicus· contention that there are more remedies available 
for abusive police conduct than there were at the time Miranda was decided ... but we 
do not agree that these additional measures ... meet the constitutional minimum." /d. at 
442. 
44. 530 U.S. at 438-41. The opinion focused on whether the Court's precedents in-
dicated that the Miranda rule was "constitutionally based." /d. Dickerson is a good ex-
ample of how the Court sometimes avoids factual questions by focusing on more tradi-
tionally "legal" authority. such as the Court's own precedent. 
45. We recognize that one might argue that the Court is simply changing its stan-
dard of legal review but cloaking this move under the guise of more or less deference to 
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C. INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN "ON THE RECORD 
REVIEW" AND REVIEW INDEPENDENT OF 
THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 
In most cases where Congress has found social facts, the 
Court does not treat these facts as the exclusive set relevant to 
determining the constitutionality of the statute. Regardless of 
whether it defers to these facts or does not, it considers other 
data that the litigants develop.46 In cases involving Congress's 
power to enforce section 5 of the 14th Amendment, however, 
the Court has more recently reviewed the constitutionality of the 
statute on the fact-finding record that Congress has assembled to 
try to establish whether Congress's enforcement scheme is "con-
gruent and proportional" to the rights Congress is trying to en-
force.47 In Kimel v. Board of Regents, the Court found the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) could not abrogate 
state sovereign immunity because "[a] review of the ADEA's 
legislative record as a whole, ... reveals that Congress had virtu-
ally no reason to believe that state and local governments were 
unconstitutionally discriminating against their employees on the 
basis of age."olll One year later, in Board of Trustees of the Uni-
versity of Alabama v. Garrett, an abrogation provision of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act was similarly invalidated.49 The 
majority opini<;m conclude.d t~a~ C~ngress. failed t~ identi~~ a 
pattern of IrratiOnal state discnmmatwn agamst th~ disabled. In 
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs' 1 and Tennes-
see v. Lane'2 the Court upheld Congress' abrogation of the Elev-
congressional fact-finding. A realist would not see much difference between the standard 
of legal review and the deference affording congressional findings. But if one believes as 
we do in the discipline of law. there is an advantage to candor and clarity in the Court's 
legal doctrine. A more consistent approach to fact-finding would require the Court in 
turn to acknowledge and justify the change in the standard of review that is really driving 
its opinion. 
46. See, e.g .. Eldred v. Ashcroft. 537 U.S. 186. 204-07 (2000) (citing the congres-
sional record as well as scholarly journals to conclude that Congress's extension of copy-
right protection to the author's life plus seventy years was "a rational exercise of the leg-
islative authority conferred by the copyright clause"): Turner Broadcasting System. Inc. 
v. FCC. 512 U.S. 622. 669 (1994) (Blackmun, J.. concurring) (stating that in addition to 
congressional findings. "[t]he record before the District Court no doubt will benefit from 
any additional evidence the Government and the other parties now see fit to present"). 
47. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
48. 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000). The evidence Congress had compiled consisted of iso-
lated sentences clipped from floor debates and legislative reports, as well as a 1966 report 
prepared by the state of California. !d. at 69. 
49. 531 u.s. 356 (2001). 
50. !d. at 369. 
51. 538 u.s. 721 (2003). 
52. 541 u.s. 509 (2004). 
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enth Amendment, but only after satisfying themselves that Con-
gress had found sufficient facts on the record." 
This inconsistency in the Court's cases is also troubling. 
First, it is not at all clear why the Constitution justifies on the re-
cord review in some cases and not others. Second, on the record 
review provokes tension with Congress, because the Court is 
delving into congressional work product.54 In contrast, an inde-
pendent review of facts would bring unity across constitutional 
doctrine and reduce direct conflicts with Congress. 
D. THE METHOD OF REVIEW: THE LOWER COURT 
RECORD AS A FACTUAL RECORD OR A 
FACT-FINDING FREE-FOR-ALL 
The Court has never developed a consistent framework for 
receiving legislative facts into evidence. This inconsistency ap-
pears whether Congress has made factual findings or not. The 
Court does not seem to require a fully developed factual record 
from the lower courts before deciding a constitutional question. 
Indeed, in many instances the Court has not confined its review 
to evidence introduced in the district court, instead relying on 
evidence submitted by amicus briefs at the Supreme Court level. 
The Court's lack of a firm methodology for constitutional 
fact-finding is exemplified by Walters v. Nat'/ Association of Ra-
diation Survivors, in which the Court held constitutional the 
congressional limitation of a $10 maximum fee that a veteran 
may pay an attorney or other representative before the Veterans 
Administration when seeking benefits for a service related death 
53. Lane. 541 U.S. at 527 (noting a report before Congress showed that 76% of 
public services and programs housed in state owned building were inaccessible to and 
unusable by persons with disabilities): Hibbs. 538 U.S. at 730-31 (noting that the legisla-
tive record included a Bureau of Labor Statistics survey indicating that 37% of private 
sector employees had maternity leave policies. while only 18% were covered by paternity 
leave policies. and that Congress heard testimony that fathers faced discriminatory 
treatment with respect to child-care leave policies in both the private and public sectors). 
54. Cf William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro. Legislative Record Review. 54 
STAN. L. REV. 87. 136-43. 160-61 (2001): Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney. Dissing 
Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80. 83-86. 144 (2001 ). See generally Senator Dewine's in-
quiries during Justice Roberts confirmation hearings regarding fact-finding. including 
questions such as: "In your opinion. what role should a judge play when reviewing con-
gressional fact-findings? In your view. how much deference do congressional fact-
findings deserve?" Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2005/09113/AR2005091301469.html: see also Senator Dewine·s similar inquiries during 
Justice Alito's confirmation hearing. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/ article/2006/01110/ AR2006011001087.html. 
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or disability.'' The Court reversed a district court's grant of a 
preliminary injunction, finding that the congressional statute did 
not violate due process, and explicitly gave deference to con-
gressional findings on the appropriateness of the fee limitation. 56 
Despite the fact that the due process inquiry was very much de-
pendent on legislative facts and despite complaints from concur-
ring and dissenting Justices that there was an inadequate factual 
record,57 the Court declared that the statute was not per se un-
constitutional based on the very limited lower court record from 
the preliminary injunction hearing.'s The fact that the Court did 
not consider a remand warranted demonstrates an unwillingness 
to engage in a rigorous approach towards fact-finding. 
Even in cases that do not involve congressional findings, the 
Court will often take judicial notice of factual contentions that 
were not introduced in the adversarial proceedings in the lower 
court. In Grutter v. Bollinger, for instance, which upheld the 
University of Michigan Law School's race-based admissions pol-
icy, the Court relied on factual assertions in the amicus briefs of 
educational associations, businesses and some retired generals in 
finding that diversity in education is a compelling state interest, 
although these claims had never been subject to cross examina-
tion or other procedural scrutiny.59 In United States v. Virginia,(fJ 
where the Court held that the Virginia Military Institute's male-
only admission policy violated equal protection, the Court relied 
on amicus briefs and newspaper articles in making its finding 
that the justification for the policy was not "exceedingly persua-
sive.""1 Although this conclusion directly conflicted with the 
findings of the district court,62 the Court did not find error in the 
lower court's findings but rather simply substituted its own new, 
"d "' ex parte ev1 ence. ·
55. 473 u.s. 305 (1985). 
56. /d. at 330 n.12 (""When Congress makes findings on essentially factual issues .... 
these findings are of course entitled to a great deal of deference."). 
57. /d. at 338 (O'Connor. J .. concurring) (noting that "[t]he merits of these claims 
are difficult to evaluate ... at the preliminary injunction stage."); id. at 356-57 (Brennan. 
J.. dissenting) ("The Court rummages through the partially developed record and seizes 
upon scattered evidence introduced by the Government on the eve of the preliminary-
injunction hearing-evidence that never has been tested in a trial on the merits-and 
pronounces that evidence ·reliable' and compelling."). 
58. /d. at 334. 
59. 539 u.s. 306.330-32 (2000). 
60. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
61. /d. at 544-45 & n. 13-15. 
62. 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.O. Va. 1994). 
63. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 585-86 (Scalia, J.. dissenting). 
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This kind of procedural inconsistency undermines the vir-
tues of judicial fact-finding, and accordingly in Part IV we offer a 
framework that helps assure that judicial social fact-finding fol-
lows traditional, adversarial legal procedures that promote fair-
ness and accuracy. The Court is certainly capable of following 
such a framework. It has engaged in something close to the type 
of review we advocate in recent cases dealing with pornograph4 
under the First Amendment. For instance, in Reno v. ACLU, 
where the Court found internet regulations aimed at protecting 
minors unconstitutionally overbroad, the opinion focused on the 
410 factual findings made by the district court.65 The Court based 
its own factual judgments on the findings in this record and did 
not rely on evidence drawn from amicus briefs.66 The Court took 
this approach because there was no congressional record of fact-
findings to rely on.67 We will argue that the Court should not 
vary its fact-finding method based on the absence or presence of 
congressional fact-finding. 
II. PAST ANALYSIS OF THE RELATION BETWEEN 
JUDICIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL FACT-FINDING 
The question of the relation between judicial and congres-
sional fact-finding is not a new one, and here we briefly review 
some of the prior literature on the subject. The early commenta-
tors correctly saw that a key determinant of whether the judici-
ary should make its own de novo findings of fact was the relative 
capacity of Congress and the Courts to engage in the finding of 
social facts. The principal problem with their analysis was that 
their models of judicial and congressional behavior lacked so-
phistication. In contrast, modern academic treatments often skirt 
this key question and instead rely on two other lines of analysis. 
The first argues that the Court should defer to congressional 
fact-finding in a particular area of the law. The second contends 
that the Court should not review the record of congressional 
fact-finding as if Congress were an administrative agency and the 
Court were engaged in "arbitrary and capriciousness review." 
64. 521 u.s. 844 (1997). 
65. /d. at 849 n.2 (noting that the lower court's findings included "'356 paragraphs of 
the parties' stipulation and 54 findings based on evidence received in open court"). 
66. See also United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group. Inc .. 529 U.S. 803. 818-
22 (2000) (focusing on district court record on the question of whether "signal bleed" was 
a pervasive enough problem that Congress could constitutionally require cable operators 
to block or scramble such programming). 
67. Reno. 521 U.S. at 876: see also id. at 858 n.24. 
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We believe that neither of these critiques addresses the es-
sential issues for determining the proper role of the court vis-a-
vis Congress in social fact-finding. By focusing on congressional 
fact-finding in specific areas rather than comparing judicial to 
congressional fact-finding in general, the first set of commenta-
tors have tended to confuse the level of deference due to Con-
gress in a particular area of law with the level of deference to 
congressional fact-finding. The second set of commentators criti-
cize the practice of reviewing a factual record created by Con-
gress, but do not posit how the Court should review the relevant 
legislative facts. None of the arguments made by these commen-
tators undermines the judiciary's obli~ation to engage in inde-
pendent fact-finding on its own record. 
We end this section by distinguishing our position from 
those who want to make social facts bulk larger in constitutional 
doctrine more generally. We do not seek to make constitutional 
doctrine depend more on the finding of social facts than imple-
mentation of formal rules. Instead we take the shape of constitu-
tional doctrine as a given and suggest only that if social facts are 
dispositive under that doctrine, the Court should engage in de 
novo review of what those facts are. 
A. EARLY ATTEMPTS TO REFINE THE JUDICIAL 
ROLE IN SOCIAL FACT-FINDING 
Legal academics first began wrestling with the intersection 
of law and science at the turn of the twentieth century. Legal re-
alism acknowledged that facts were often the driving force be-
hind legal reasoning.69 Oliver Wendell Holmes, commonly cred-
ited as a founder of this movement, argued that "[ t ]he life of the 
law has not been logic: it has been experience."70 Roscoe 
68. In our view, the best modem article about congressional fact-finding is Neal 
Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary 
Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169 (2001). While we critique the basic conclusions of this arti-
cle. see notes 200-201 and accompanying text, and believe that his comparison of the 
Court and Congress in social fact-finding is not sufficiently comprehensive, it begins to 
ask the right questions. 
69. Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 469 (1909) ("In the ordi-
nary case involving constitutionality, the court has no machinery for getting at the facts. 
It must decide on the basis of general knowledge and on accepted principles of uniform 
application."). 
70. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1963). 
But as cases such as Lochner show, Holmes was also a realist about the role a judge 
could effectively play in society, and refused to look at factual matters when his authority 
did not mandate it. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,65 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing). 
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Pound,71 Louis Brandeis,7c and Benjamin CardOZ073 emphasized 
the importance of the judicial analysis of social facts in their aca-
demic writing. 
A 1924 article by Henry Wolf Bikle in the Harvard Law 
Review was the first academic attempt to address the relation be-
tween the judiciary and the legislature in legislative fact-finding 
in constitutional decisions. 74 Bikle thought the Court had more 
legitimacy in determining 'legal' questions, like the meaning of 
"ex post facto law," as opposed to "factual" questions such as 
whether limiting the hours of a baker has a substantial relation 
to public health.75 Nevertheless Bikle conceded that social fact-
finding is a necessary aspect of judicial review.76 
Around the time of the New Deal two students addressed 
the issue and came to diametrically opposed positions on the ju-
dicial treatment of a legislature's fact-finding. A Columbia law 
student was wary of deferring to legislatures in due process cases 
in an article published in 1930.77 This author thought that the 
facts should be developed by the adversarial trial process. 7~ In 
contrast, a 1936 Harvard student was critical of the Supreme 
Court's stringent review of legislation, arguing that a minimal 
legislative record of factual findings should suffice.79 He thought 
71. Roscoe Pound. Mechanical Jurisprudence. 8 COLlJM. L. REV. 605 (1908). 
72. Louis Brandeis. The Living Law. 10 ILL. L. REV. 461. 467 (1916) ("[N]o law. 
written or unwritten. can be understood without a full knowledge of the facts out of 
which it arises. and to which it is to be applied."). 
73. BENJAMIN CARDOZO. THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113 (1921) 
(judges should "get [their] knowledge just as the legislator gets it. from experiences and 
study and reflection; in brief. from life itself'): Benjamin Cardozo. A Ministry of Justice. 
35 HARV. L. REV. 113 (1921) (advocating a board that would consolidate all facts neces-
sary for the judicial making process). 
74. See Henry Wolf Bikle. Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the 
Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action. 38 HARV. L. REV. 6. 12-13 (1924). 
75. /d. 
76. /d. at 19 ("It is clear that the legislative finding as to the fact upon which the 
validity of the legislation depends cannot be allowed to be binding upon the courts, since 
this would furnish a simple means of preventing judicial review of such legislation in this 
class of cases."). 
77. Note. The Consideration of Facts in "Due Process" Cases, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 
360. 362 (1930) ("The fact that an enactment has been passed by those who are elected to 
give expression to popular wishes and who have knowledge of local conditions is always 
a factor of importance in its favor. But the facts which are important for the considera-
tion of the legislature are none the less material to a determination of the judicial ques-
tion."). 
78. "The deference owed to the legislature's conclusion should require that the 
facts on which a statute is declared invalid appear on the record. They should be ac-
cepted only when their accuracy is carefully checked, and the witnesses presenting them 
subject to cross examination.'' /d. at 367. 
79. Note, The Presentation of Facts Underlying the Constitutionality of Statutes, 49 
HARV. L. REV. 631. 633 (1936) ("Extensive legislative findings based upon detailed re-
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that the judiciary should not overturn a law unless it appeared 
that "no reasonable man in possession of such facts could agree 
with the legislature's finding. "80 
These early notes feature arguments that remain salient to-
day. On the one hand, if judges must defer to a legislature's find-
ings of fact, the legislature can potentially avoid judicial review 
by shielding themselves with fact-finding that may not be true.H1 
On the other hand, if legislatures are more in touch with the fac-
tual matters they regulate than judges, the Court should defer to 
their findings, merely considering whether a reasonable legisla-
tor could have found the facts in question to be true. 82 What 
these articles lack are more sophisticated analysis of legislative 
and judicial behavior that permit comparison of the advantages 
of judicial and congressional fact-finding. We try to fill that gap 
in section III. 
B. THE MODERN LITERATURE'S MISTAKEN 
FOCUS ON SPECIFIC LEGAL AREAS 
Unlike these early articles, the modern literature mostly 
fails to ask the fundamental question of how the judiciary should 
review legislative facts generally, and instead skips directly to 
criticisms of how the Court reviews congressional fact-finding in 
specific legal areas. For instance, some academics have re-
sponded to the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions by criti-
cizing the Court for its failure to defer to congressional fact-
finding. For instance, a large number of academics suggest that 
the Court should defer to Congress's fact-finding under section 5 
of the 14th Amendment.H3 Professors Colker and Brundey, 
ports would. perhaps. be the most satisfactory method of establishing constitutional facts. 
The ability to see. hear and investigate actual conditions is undoubtedly possessed in a 
higher degree by legislative fact-finding bodies than by their judicial counterparts.''). 
80. !d. at 636. 
81. See. e.g., Daniel J. Solove. The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review. 
and the Bill of Rights. 84 IOWA L. REV. 941. 958-59 (1999) (arguing that deference can 
undermine scrutiny and affect judicial outcomes): Lamprecht v. FCC. 958 F.2d 382-92 
n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("If a legislature could make a statute constitutional simply by 'find-
ing· that black is white. or freedom. slavery. judicial review could be an elaborate 
farce."): cf Spencer Overton. Restraint and Responsibility: Judicial Review of Campaign 
Reform. 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 663.720 (2004). 
82. See William D. Araiza. The Section 5 Power and the Rational Basis Standard of 
Equal Protection. 79 TUL. L. REV. 519.543.546,557 (2005) (arguing that Congress' man-
date from and similarity to the populace makes Congress better-suited to finding and 
acting on social fact, and that the Court's rational basis review illustrates the difficulty of 
second-guessing legislative findings except in cases of clear animus or irrationality). 
83. See generally Joseph M. Pellicciotti, Redefining the Relationship Between the 
States and the Federal Government: A Focus on the Supreme Court's Expansion of the 
2008] JUDGING FACTS LIKE LAW 87 
Siegel and Post. and Christopher Banks advocate a view of Con-
gress as a superior fact-finder that skillfully analyzes what is in 
the public interest."' As a representative body, they argue. Con-
gress receives information both formally and informally, and in a 
way that is institutionally different than the Court.H' Therefore 
the Court should defer to the facts Congress finds because Con-
gress better reflects the understanding of the people than does 
the Court.8" 
Insofar as these arguments rest on general claims about 
Congress's fact -finding ability, these articles make relevant ar-
guments, although in section III we show why they are mistaken. 
But we do not believe that for the most part these articles are 
making general comparisons about judicial and congressional 
fact-finding ability. None of the authors suggest that the Court 
should defer to Congress across the full range of constitutional 
doctrine or indeed in many areas other than federalism. For in-
stance, none of these critics criticize the First Amendment cases 
for failing to defer to Congress' judgment about the practices 
needed to protect children against indecency. None criticize 
Dickerson87 for second guessing the judgment of Congress as to 
what is the best means of preventing coerced confessions. In 
fact, Siegel and Post claim that "Garrett represents the opposite 
danger from Dickerson"' because the former "vindicates the 
value of the rule of law in ways that threaten the value of self de-
termination."& They do not elaborate on how Garrett and 
Principle of State Sovereign Immunity. II B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. I (2001). 
84. Ruth Calker & James J. Brudney. Dissing Congress. 100 MICH. L. REV. 80. 118 
(2001) (arguing that the Court's approach fails to appreciate the skill and sophistication 
that Congress brings to the information gathering process.): Robert C. Post & Reva B. 
Siegel. Protecting the Constitution from the People: luricentric Restrictions on Section 
Five Power. 78 IND. L.J. I. 14 (2003) ("Congress enacts Section 5 legislation in order to 
vindicate public understandings about the nation's needs and obligations under the Four· 
teenth Amendment. not to single out wrongdoers for blame and punishment."): Robert 
C. Post & Reva B. Siegel. Legislative Constitlllionalism and Section Five Power: Policen· 
tric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act. 112 YALE L.J. 1943. 2025 (2003) 
("[W]e vigorously contest the Court's premise that politics is a sphere so debased that it 
can only corrupt constitutional deliberation."): Christopher P. Banks. The Constitutional 
Politics of Interpreting Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 36 AKRON L. REV. 425. 
469 (2003) ("the legislature has the institutional competence to study complex problems 
of policy through the open deliberative process of many (instead of the opinion writing 
proclivities of the few in closed chambers)"). 
85. Calker & Brudney. supra note 84. at 118-20. 140: Post & Siegel. Protecting the 
Constitlllion. supra note 84. at 16 ("Legislative hearing ought not to stimulate adversar-
ies: their primary purpose is to inspire new forms of collective commitment."). 
86. Calker & Brudney. supra note 84. at 11tl. 
87. Dickerson v. United States. 530 U.S. 42S (2000). 
SS. Post & Siegel. Protecting the Constitution. supra note S4. at 22. 
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Dickerson are opposite. In both decisions the Court overruled 
the judgment of Congress on a fact-laden constitutional ques-
tion. 
Thus, we think these articles are best seen as part of the 
continuing debate about judicial intervention to protect federal-
ism. Commentators have long made arguments that members of 
Congress, being elected from states, have the information and 
incentives to strike the right balance between federalism and 
other values."'} Because the political process adequately protects 
federalism, they argue, there is no need for judicial intervention. 
But these arguments apply just as well to Congress's legal inter-
pretations as to congressional fact-finding, and in fact those who 
believe in the political safeguards argument tend to oppose judi-
cial intervention in federalism cases whether based on law or 
facts. 90 But if the Court is correct to defer to Congress in federal-
ism cases for these reasons, its deference is not dependent on a 
close analysis of its institutional fact-finding abilities more gen-
erally. And if the controversial claims that Congress is particu-
larly suited to balance federalism against other values prove in-
correct,91 the rationale for deference in fact-finding about 
federalism dissolves no less than the rationale for limiting judi-
cial review in federalism cases more generally.92 
89. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States 
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 
(1954): JESSE CHOPER. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 
176-81 ( 1980) (arguing that the structure of congressional committees and leadership 
system protects state interests): Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Safe-
guards of Federalism. 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 278-79 (2000) (arguing that political par-
ties will operate in Congress to protect state interests). 
90. See, e.g., Choper, supra note 89. at 169-70. 314-15 (concluding that federalism 
issues should be treated like political questions). 
91. See John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States' Rights: A Defense of 
Judicial Review in a Federal System, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 89 (2004) (arguing that judicial 
review is needed to protect federalist system). 
92. We thus distinguish complaints that federalism cases are wrongly decided be-
cause Congress is in fact a superior fact-fact finder from those that suggest the Court has 
wrongly intervened by converting questions of fact into questions of law, and should take 
a deferential approach to both facts and law in federalism cases. This has been Justice 
Souter's critique of the Commerce Clause cases. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598, 638 (2000) (Souter, J. dissenting) (faulting the majority for its "new characteriza-
tion" of commerce clause doctrine which "suggest[s] that 'substantial effects' analysis is 
not a factual inquiry for Congress in the first instance with subsequent judicial review 
looking only to the rationality of the congressional conclusion, but one of a rather differ-
ent sort, dependent on a uniquely judicial competence"). 
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C. THE MODERN LITERATURE: CRITICISM OF 
"ON THE RECORD REVIEW'' 
89 
Several commentators have also criticized the Court for 
treating Congress like an agency when it reviews congressional 
fact-finding.93 Professor Buzbee and Schapiro offer several ar-
guments why the justifications for record review of administra-
tive agencies should not translate to judicial review of Congress 
in cases involving Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.94 
First, the separation of powers issues at stake in administrative 
and congressional review are different. 95 The Court reviews the 
agency's record at Congress' behest to assure legislative suprem-
acy. but protection of legislative supremacy can hardly be a justi-
fication for reviewing the record of Congress.96 Second, record 
review is too narrow a compass to measure Congress's fact-
finding, because members of Congress, unlike agency officials, 
have access to sources of information too diffuse and wide-
ranging to be captured by the record.97 Third, record review be-
speaks an unjustified suspicion of Congress's motives, because it 
is designed to see whether Congress's factual claims are pretex-
tual."x 
These three arguments seem solid to us, but they do not 
suggest that the Court should not compile its own record to re-
view. It is true that independent judicial review of congressional 
fact-finding is not warranted to protect legislative supremacy. 
Nevertheless independent judicial fact-finding still may be war-
ranted to protect the supremacy of the Constitution by assuring 
that a statute is supported by the factual predicate constitution-
ally required. Congress's diffuse sources of information do not 
negate an independent role for the Court if the Court has com-
parative or even distinctive strengths in fact-finding. Finally, ju-
dicial fact-finding on its own record does not impugn Congress' 
motives any more than does judicial interpretation of the Consti-
93. See, e.g .. Harold J. Krent. Turning Congress into an Agency: The Propriety of 
Requiring Legislative Findings. 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731, 737 (1996) (arguing that 
"requiring the legislature to make findings appears to denigrate the respect due a coor· 
dinate branch of government"). 
94. See Buzbee & Schapiro. supra note 54. 
95. /d.: see also A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone. Remanding to Con· 
gress: The Supreme Court's New "On the Record" Constitutional Review of Statutes, 86 
CORNELL L. REv. 328. 369-83 (2001) (arguing that on the record review is in tension 
with separation of powers because it involves improper scrutiny of Congress' s internal 
processes). 
96. Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 54. at 124-25. 
97. !d. at 134-35. 
98. !d. at 139. 
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tution, because in passing legislation, Congress must find that it 
is constitutionally warranted both in law and in fact. 
Professors Frickey and Smith also argue that the Court 
should not oversee congressional fact-finding, but their grounds 
are very different: Congress is not a fact-finding body at all but 
rather a market for competing influences.99 But this critique sug-
gests only that the Court should not engage in fact-finding by re-
viewing a congressional record because that record is inherently 
unreliable. It does not suggest that the Court should abandon 
review of the facts. Indeed, because under Frickey/Smith's view 
Congress cannot be trusted to care about the facts relevant to a 
constitutional restraint, their analysis would appear to support 
an independent and de novo judicial review of the facts. 100 
Thus, while commentators have persuasively challenged "on 
the record review" of congressionally found facts, these argu-
ments do not suggest, as we do, that the judiciary should engage 
in its own independent de novo review. 
D. THE SCOPE FOR SOCIALFACf-FINDING IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCfRINE 
Finally, our position differs from those who want to make 
constitutional doctrine more dependent on social facts and less 
99. Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, The Congressional Proc-
ess, and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1745 
(2002) (When the court is expecting Congress to use rational decision-making based on 
evidence before it in federalism cases. "[i]t is demanding that the legislative process be-
come something it is not and cannot be in a system of competitive parties operating 
through several institutions with shared policymaking responsibilities."). 
100. In cutain instances. such as equal protection and First Amendment cases. the 
Court looks to the "motive" of the legislature that passed the law in order to determine 
its constitutionality. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (invalidating 
congressional flag burning ban and noting that it was passed in response to the Court's 
Texas v. Johnson decision striking Texas's ban); United States Dep't. of Agriculture v. 
Moreno. 413 U.S. 528. 534 (1973) ("if the constitutional conception of ·equal protection 
of the laws· means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional de-
sire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental 
interest"). In some instances, the Court's analysis of the facts will be an implicit means of 
"smoking out" unconstitutional motives, See, e.g, Gil Seinfeld, The Possibility of Pretext 
Analrsis in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1251. 1324-27 
(2003) (arguing that the absence of congressional findings can indicate a pretext); see also 
Ashutosh Bhagwat. Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REv. 297. 
312-13 (1997). In cases in which the legislature's motive is relevant. the evidence Con-
gress amasses to explain the need for its actions would bear on its motive. But this does 
not undermine our view that in social fact-finding the Court should not confine itself to 
the congressional record. First. if motive is the focus on constitutional doctrine, the ques-
tion is not the objective truth of social facts, but what Congress believed were the social 
facts. The congressional record is directly probative of Congress's belief. Second. even in 
these circumstances. the record may not be the only evidence of Congress' motive. 
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on formal rules. For instance, Judge Posner's constitutional 
"pragmatism" is based on the belief that the constitution is so 
vague, and it has been interpreted so inconsistently, that the only 
way to resolve difficult questions is to look empirically at how 
different doctrines would help achieve widely shared policy ob-
jectives.101 Rather than look to the "purpose" of the legislation 
(an impossible task, in his view) or to abstract principles of mo-
rality or legal reasoning, Posner thinks that judges need empiri-
cal knowledge for the "task of exploring the operation and con-
sequences of constitutionalism." 10 We, in contrast, do not take a 
position on the extent to which constitutional doctrine should 
turn on social facts. Thus, we do not take a position on whether 
the medical necessity of partial-birth abortions should be rele-
vant to the constitutional jurisprudence of abortion. Assuming 
that a particular constitutional doctrine does depend on a ques-
tion of social facts, we instead analyze how the Court should act 
when Congress has claimed to have found the social facts neces-
sary as a constitutional predicate. 
III. JUDICIAL VS. CONGRESSIONAL 
FINDING OF SOCIAL FACTS 
In this section, we dispel philosophical and pragmatic objec-
tions to independent judicial assessment of social facts. We first 
show that there are no ontological or analytic distinctions be-
tween interpretation of law and finding of fact. Legal meaning 
and factual findings are both social facts and subject to conven-
tional methods of proof and disproof. 
We then show the judiciary is at no comparative disadvan-
tage in social fact-finding. We first consider a pure public choice 
perspective on Congress' fact-finding ability. In a public choice 
model, Congress is viewed as an institution populated by mem-
bers who are predominantly interested in reelection. Such a 
model suggests that Congress would have little interest in finding 
the actual facts about social policy, because they would be pri-
marily focused on satisfying the preferences of their constituents. 
Moreover, drawing on very recent public choice analysis, we 
101. RICHARD POSNER. OVERCOMING LAW 207 (1995) ("The interpretative ques-
tion is ultimately a political. economic. or social one to which social science mav have 
more to contribute than law."). · 
102. Richard A. Posner. Against Constitutional Theory. 73 N.Y.U. L REV. 1. 11 
(1998); see also Richard A. Posner. The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory. 111 
HARV. L REV. 1637. 1701-02 (1998) (arguing that technical factual information is more 
easily ascertainable than esoteric legal or philosophical arguments). 
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show that these constituents would expect Congress to find so-
cial facts in line with their preferences rather than the actual 
facts. We then relax the stringency of the public choice model 
and credit members of Congress with an independent interest in 
getting the relevant facts right. Even under these assumptions, 
which we call the behavioral law and economics model, congres-
sional fact-finding will often be deficient, because interest groups 
will wield substantial influence on shaping the consideration of 
facts before Congress and members will be subject to cognitive 
biases not easily dislodged by the process of congressional hear-
ings. Thus, it is not only the motivations of Congress but also its 
structure that inhibit accurate finding of social facts. 
In contrast, the federal judiciary is insulated from the pres-
sures of constituents because judges do not face reelection. 
Moreover, interest groups yield relatively less influence in litiga-
tion than legislation. The adversarial process also disciplines 
cognitive bias and limits the effects of certain heuristics that 
make congressional fact-finding less accurate. 
We then respond to arguments that the judiciary is never-
theless less competent than Congress at social fact-finding be-
cause Congress, like a jury, has a range of perspectives that the 
judiciary lacks. Social facts, however, do not resemble adjudica-
tory facts that can be resolved by the collective and diverse ex-
perience of individuals. Like the question of whether abortions 
are ever medically necessary, such social facts tend to depend on 
technical and statistical investigation that is beyond most peo-
ple's experience. What the judiciary lacks in diversity it makes 
up for in technical competence. In any event, judicial insulation 
and lack of diversity is at least as much of a problem in judicial 
legal interpretation and yet judicial review of the law remains a 
cornerstone of our polity. 
We move from social science analysis to structural analysis 
of the Constitution and show that departmentalism-the notion 
that each branch has an independent duty to interpret the Con-
stitution-supports de novo judicial fact-finding even if judicial 
fact-finding is not better than congressional fact-finding, but 
simply has different strengths. We end by responding to those 
who have argued that the judiciary should defer to fact-finding 
in some areas of the law, such as separations of powers or cam-
paign finance, because of the peculiar incentives at work there. 
We show that our analysis of legislative and congressional be-
havior still suggests that judicial fact-finding has distinctive 
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strengths throughout the law and thus judges should exercise a 
de novo review of facts across the board. 
A. THE COMMONALITY OF LAW AND F ACf 
There is no ontological or analytic difference between law 
and fact that makes social facts unsuitable for judicial investiga-
tion and proof. Indeed, like many scholars of evidence, we do 
not believe an ontological or epistemological distinction exists 
between what is 'law' and what is 'fact.' 10 ~ Consider, for instance, 
the process by which a judge would discover the meaning of "re-
cess" in the Recess Appointments Clause. 104 An originalist judge 
would weigh various bits of factual evidence from the time of the 
Framing. He might consult an eighteenth-century dictionary to 
pin down the conventional usage of the time. He might look at 
the ratification debates to gain a better understanding of the 
clause's meaning in the particular context. Thus, he would be in-
vestigating social facts about the world. A judge who embraced a 
consequentalist approach would employ a different legal me-
thod, but nevertheless also sift through facts about the world. 
For instance, she might focus on how the various branches 
would interact, depending on the meaning assigned "recess." 
She might consult political science texts that describe the rela-
tion between the President and Congress, and review the after-
math of past recess appointments. 
Legal questions are simply "part of the more general cate-
gory of factual questions." 105 As such, both are subject to dispute 
as to their content and need to be established by weighing con-
flicting evidence.106 To be sure, the kind of evidence to be 
weighed may differ between pure legal interpretation and fact-
finding, but, as our example above shows, different kinds of legal 
interpretation require the weighing of different kinds of evi-
dence. Indeed, it is ultimately difficult to understand what it 
would mean to adhere to a metaphysical or epistemological dis-
103. Ronald J. Allen & MichaelS. Pardo. The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction. 97 
NW. U. L. REV. 1769 (2003). 
104. U.S. CONST. Art. II.. sec. 2. cl. 3; see also Michael B. Rappaport. The Original 
Meaning of the Recess Appointment Clause. 52 UCLA L. REv. 1487 (2005) (describing 
how to discover the original meaning of the clause). 
105. Allan & Pardo. supra note 103. at 1770. 
106. One analytically sound distinction can be made between law creation and fact-
finding, but this difference is only temporal-once law is created it is a social fact. /d. at 
1804. 
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tinction between le?ral interpretations and social facts since law 
itself is a social fact. 07 
As a result, the real questions about whether the judiciary 
should wield an independent, de novo role in social fact-finding 
are pragmatic, comparative, and structural. In our next sections, 
we thus turn to two questions. First, does Congress have an ad-
vantage over the judiciary in finding social facts? Second, even if 
one were to agree that Congress has some general advantage, 
does the judiciary nevertheless bring some distinctive strengths 
to social fact- finding? 
B. THE RELIABILITY OF CONGRESSIONAL FACf-FINDING 
The prevailing view has largely been that legislative bodies 
(and particularly Congress) are better than courts at making 
broad factual determinations. 108 This belief is based in part on 
Congress' size and diverse membership, its responsiveness to the 
public needs and its tendency to look at the "big picture" rather 
than an individual case in which narrower issues are decided. 
But the assumption that Congress is a superior fact-finding body 
overlooks the incentives of the individuals who compose it. Con-
gress certainly can assemble information designed to support its 
legislative objectives. But Congress' political nature makes it 
unlikely that this process will resemble a fair and unbiased at-
tempt to evaluate all the facts relevant to the legislation and its 
constitutionality. 
First, we consider how public choice analysis, which applies 
''economic models of human behavior to the political process,"109 
would model the fact-finding abilities of legislatures. Once one 
recognizes that well organized interest groups have an incentive 
to use their power to the detriment of others, 110 and elected poli-
ticians have an incentive to seek rewards in votes and money, 
the reliability of congressional fact-finding should be immedi-
ately called into question. Here we add an important but never 
before discussed confirming factor: the public will expect Con-
107. H.L.A. HART. THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). 
101\. For a good summary of these arguments. see Devins, supra note 68. at 1178--82: 
see also Buzbee & Schapiro. supra note 54, at 143 ("[Courts] are not well-suited to gather 
the evidence necessary to assess the magnitude of complex social practices. such as in-
vidious discrimination against the disabled."); Louis Fisher. Constitutional Interpretation 
by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV. 707. 722 (1985). 
109. Craig S. Lerner. Legislators as the "American Criminal Class": Why Congress 
(Sometimes) Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 599. 608. 
llll See generally MANCUR OLSEN. THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). 
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gress to find the facts that support its preferences, not the actual 
facts. Second, we apply a more mixed model rooted in behav-
ioral economics and assume that members of Congress also pur-
sue some general sense of the public interest in their fact-finding. 
We will show that even if this is the case, Congress' fact-finding 
has systemic defects because its structure for fact-finding cannot 
cabin the biases created by widely shared behavioral traits. 
1. The Public Choice Analysis 
a. Incentives of Legislatures Under a Public Choice 
Analysis 
The basic assumptions of public choice theory suggest that 
deference to the factual findings of Congress is undesirable. If 
members of Congress care only or even significantly about re-
election and the material benefits that can be provided by inter-
est groups, they cannot be trusted to accurately find the facts 
that determine a statute's constitutionality. Indeed, the facts 
about which they would predominantly care are the demands of 
their influential constituents and the necessary means of fulfill-
ing these demands.''' Under this view, Congress might neverthe-
less conduct committee hearings to investigate facts for a variety 
of reasons. Hearings may help them learn the demands of con-
stituents. They may create a forum for bargaining with other 
members for votes. They may also provide a fa<;ade to mask 
what is really driving the content of legislation. For instance, if a 
powerful company is asking for anticompetitive regulations, the 
committee may create a focus on consumer complaints in the 
area. In fact, public choice predicts that members of Congress 
will try to create information to confuse the opposition while 
pleasing concentrated interest groups."" 
Most relevantly for our purposes, members of Congress 
may generate a record supporting their legislation if challenged 
in court. But this purpose hardly suggests that the members of 
Ill. Devins. supra note oR. at 11R2: see also Saul M. Pilchen. Politics v. the Cloister: 
Decidinf? When the Supreme Court Should Defer to Conwessional Factfinding Under the 
Post-Civil War Amendments. 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 337.360--67 (19R4) ( .. The tool of 
investigation may be wielded not to provide legislators with a sound basis for selecting 
one legislative program over another. but rather to mollify constituents' demands that 
some action be taken on particularly controversial issues.··). 
112. See John 0. McGinnis. The Bar Against Challenges to Employment Consent 
Decrees: A Puhlic Choice Perspecti<·e. 54 LA. L. REV. 1507. !530--31 (1994) (discussing 
the way political actors try to raise information costs of their opponents by disguising 
their objectives). 
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Congress will be interested in the objective facts. Instead, they 
will be focused on creating a legislative record that will put the 
legislation in the most favorable light. 113 They will in fact be less 
careful and objective insofar as the judiciary gives the findings 
more deference, because their assembly and slanting of the facts 
will escape scrutiny. The Court's decision in Carhart v. Gonzales 
to defer to Congress' fact-findings even when other facts in the 
record were found false would hardly encourage Congress to be 
meticulous or objective.114 In fact, one of the findings Congress 
made when enacting the Partial Birth Abortion Act is that its 
legislative findings would be accorded deference by the Supreme 
Court.115 Thus, there is a dynamic relationship between the 
Court's deferential treatment and the brazenness of Congress. 
Therefore, under the public choice model, the Court's cur-
rent approach of examining the facts found in the congressional 
record as an aid to determining a law's constitutionality is inher-
ently unreliable. It is comparable to reviewing the facts found by 
a litigant in an ex parte proceeding. It encourages members of 
Congress to manipulate the facts that enter the legislative record 
in order to secure delivery of the goods demanded of them. 
Nor is Congress's fact-finding likely to be improved by the 
structure of its processes, because its committee hearings may 
not even elicit relevant information, and in any event the infor-
mation elicited will not substantially constrain the facts Congress 
finds in its committee reports. The structure of committee hear-
ings is not well-designed to gather the best information repre-
senting a perspective. 116 First, the committee in general and its 
chairman in particular control the witness list, and thus only wit-
nesses from the perspectives chosen by the committee will be 
heard. 117 It is true that both the majority and the minority in 
113. Wendy M. Rogovin. The Politics of Facts: The Illusion of Certainty. 46 
HASTINGS L.J. 1723. 1750 (1995) (arguing that a congressional hearing is a legal fiction: 
the facts are found by the members of Congress before the hearing takes place). 
114. Carhart v. Gonzales. 127 S. Ct. at 1638. Justice Ginsburg's dissent gives a tour 
de force of Congress's false "findings." /d. at 1643--44. 
115. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531 History and Statutory Notes, Congressional Finding 8 
(2005). 
116. Julius Cohen. Hearing on a Bill: Legislative Folklore?. 37 MINN. L. REV. 34. 42 
(1952) ("Why complicate unnecessarily the harassed life of the average Congressman 
and Senator by endeavoring to foist on him the duties for which his talents are not espe-
cially equipped. and for which he scarcely has any time. considering the tremendous de-
mands upon his office. For the task of checking the immediate fact situation which a leg-
islative proposal seeks to correct. something more is necessary than mere testimonials 
from witnesses with axes to grind."). 
117. See Pilchen. supra note 111. at 367-68 (discussing committee chairpersons· 
power and arguing that "the structure and composition of specialized committees may 
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practice can call witnesses, even if the majority calls the lion's 
share. But this does not assure that contending perspectives on 
legislation will necessarily be heard. The majority and minority 
may essentially agree on legislative objectives when popular 
opinion is on one side of an issue. Even when popular opinion is 
divided, the committee may follow the views of interest groups 
united in favor of the legislation. 
In any event, no matter who testifies, the majority members 
of the committee can determine which witnesses to credit. Thus, 
the committee report will reflect the determinations of its major-
ity members, and it is the findings in that report on which the 
legislation will be based to which the judiciary will defer. 11H 
b. Incentives of the Public Under a Public Choice 
Analysis 
On many, if not most, issues the general public will exercise 
little influence on congressionai fact -finding and thus pose no 
constraint on congressional inaccuracy. Citizens have very little 
knowledge of legislation in general, let alone more technical po-
litical information like the content of a factual record compiled 
by Congress. The ignorance of citizens in this regard is "ra-
tional" and thus intractable. First, since the collective decisions 
of legislators will generally have less effect on the individual citi-
zen than will his own private decisions, he will rationally invest 
his scarce time and resources in gathering information about his 
private enterprises rather than information about the common 
enterprise of government. 119 Second, since any citizen is unlikely 
in the extreme to provide the decisive vote in any legislative 
~lection, ~e will stint on ac~~iring .inform~tion abou~ public pol-
Icy for this reason as well. - Studies confirm that citizens have 
lead to fact-finding that merely ratifies prejudices or other legislative proclivities"). 
118. We also recognize that at times Congress gets some of its information from ad-
ministrative agencies and commissions. but administrative fact-finding is influenced by 
special interest capture in the agencies themselves. Even if agencies are not captured. 
they depend on Congress for their authority and budget. and tend to provide the facts 
Congress wants to hear. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina. Cognitive Psy-
chology and Optimal Government Design. 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 569 (2002). Finally. 
on many important issues, like partial-birth abortions. agencies simply do not testify. See 
e.g. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 760 Before the Subcomm. 
on the Canst. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary. 108th Cong. 6-35 (2003). 
119. See John 0. McGinnis. 1he Once and Fuwre Property Based Vision of the First 
Amendment. 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49. 125 (1996) (describing this motivation for indiffer-
ence to public policy information). 
120. See Frank H. Easterbrook. The State of Madison ·s Vision of the State: A Public 
Choice Perspective. 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328. 1331 (1994) (discussing this contribution to 
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very low knowledge about the basic facts of government- let 
alone the specific factual claims by which Congress supports spe-
cific legislation. 121 
Second, insofar as the public exerts influence on congres-
sional fact-finding, it is likely to undermine Congress' accuracy. 
The public is "rationally irrational" as well as "rationally igno-
rant," and thus believes many things that are not true when 
those beliefs coincide with substantive preferences and biases.122 
Citizens are rationally irrational for reasons of economic logic 
similar to those that encourage rational ignorance. Citizens will 
prefer to believe factual claims that cohere with their prefer-
ences or otherwise make them feel happy or virtuous, regardless 
of truth or falsity, unless falsity exposes them to harm. 123 
As a result, individuals face a truth versus falsity calculus in 
their beliefs about their private life that is very different from 
that about public policy. For instance, believing that a poisonous 
household substance is harmless may be very costly indeed. But 
holding a false belief about a public rather than private matter 
may impose negligible costs. The chance that one's false belief 
will be decisive in influencing the public policy at issue is no 
greater than the chance that one's vote will decisive. 124 And only 
if the false belief is decisive will the individual's adherence to the 
belief bring about the public policy and thus inflict harm on the 
individual. As a result the public has little incentive to embrace 
true factual beliefs in public policy, and in areas as diverse as 
economics and toxicology it has been shown that the public's 
factual beliefs about public policy are distorted by biases and in 
many respects are simply mistaken. 125 The public's factual beliefs 
are sometimes forms of self-expression rather than products of 
factual inquiry."" 
rational ignorance). 
121. See, e.g .. Ilya Somin. Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty. 
89 IOWA L. REV. 1287. 1290-91 (2004) (summarizing evidence and research on the sub-
ject). For the most thorough political science analysis of voter ignorance. see MICHAEL 
X. DELLI CARP!Nl & SCOTI KEETER. WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND 
WHY IT MATIERS (1996) (documenting widespread voter ignorance and explaining the 
importance of political knowledge to the democratic process). See also Ilya Somin, Voter 
Ignorance and the Democratic Ideal. 12 CRlTICAL REV. 413 (1998). 
122. For a discussion of "rational irrationality." see BYRAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF 
THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE BAD POLICIES 17-18 (2007). 
123. /d. 
124. /d. at 131. 
125. /d. at 51-92 (presenting evidence of public's mistaken views on economics) & 
id. at 160-62 (presenting evidence of the public's mistaken views on toxicology). 
126. See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy. 24 
YALE L. & PoL"Y REV. 149, 171 (2006) ("The phenomenon of cultural cognition refers to 
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Thus, it seems likely that where the public has policy pref-
erences, they will be biased to believe in facts congenial to those 
policies, and expect their legislature to find these congenial facts, 
including those facts that would permit those policies to be up-
held by the Supreme Court. As a result, when an issue becomes 
so salient as to attract the public's attention, citizens will not 
only fail to be a force for accuracy in legislative fact-finding, they 
may well become catalysts of inaccuracy. 
Take an issue as politically salient as partial-birth abortion. 
Large majorities believe that partial-birth abortion should be 
prohibited. m Given "rational irrationality" it seems likely that 
these same majorities would be primed to expect that partial-
birth abortion is never medically necessary, because that factual 
belief would most easily cohere with their preferences. As a re-
sult, insofar as they did pay attention to congressional fact-
finding on this matter, most would expect Congress to find abor-
tions never medically necessary, thus creating some pressure for 
such factual findings regardless of truth. 
2. Behavorial Law and Economics Analysis 
In this section we consider a model of congressional behav-
ior in which the motives of members of Congress are more 
mixed. While members of Congress retain an interest in shaping 
the fact-finding that enhances their electoral prospects, they also 
have an interest in the accuracy of their fact-finding. Neverthe-
less, because of heuristics and biases that members of Congress 
share with people in general, congressional fact-finding will still 
have systematic defects. If our first model relies on the latest in-
sights of public choice, our second draws on recent findings from 
behavioral economics. Neither model captures the whole truth 
about congressional behavior in legislative fact-finding, but the 
similarity of their conclusions provides far more powerful evi-
a series of interlocking social and psychological mechanisms that induce individuals to 
conform their factual beliefs about contested policies to their cultural evaluations of the 
activities subject to regulation."). 
127. In 2003. 68% of adults nationwide favored a ban on partial-birth abortion in the 
last few months of pregnancy. See CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll. Oct. 24-26, 
http://www.pollingreport.com/abortion.htm. When asked to consider the procedure over 
the last six months of pregnancy. 57% of adults nationwide supported a ban. See Los 
Angelos Times Poll. Jan. 30-Feb 2. 2003. http://www.pollingreport.com/abortion.htm. In 
one poll. only 41% of adults nationwide thought partial-birth abortion should be legal. 
even if it would prevent a serious threat to the woman's health. See ABC News Poll. July 
16-20 2003. http://www.pollingreport.com/abortion.htm. 
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dence about congressional fact-finding's reliability than a model 
based on a single view of the world. 
Many observers believe that members of Congress care 
about matters other than reelection, such as ideology, the con-
scientious carrying out of their duties, and the respect of their 
colleagues.12s Some of these objectives, such as conscientious-
ness, should translate into concern about the accuracy of fact-
finding. Moreover, at least in some instances a long-term self-
interest of members of Congress coincides with finding facts ac-
curately, because in the long run the way the world actually 
works may change the preferences of citizens. 129 Even under 
these more generous assumptions, Congress has important sys-
temic defects as a fact-finder. 
One problem arises from the selective flow of information 
to Congress. It is widely recognized that interest groups, both 
economically and ideologically based, are the most effective 
conduits of information to the legislature.130 There are an infinite 
number of facts Congress could be aware of, but even a member 
of Congress who wants to know as many facts as possible is lim-
ited by the demands of his office. 131 Therefore it requires the co-
ordination and investment of interest groups to bring facts to a 
member's attention, particularly if they know that a statute's 
constitutionality might be based on favorable facts in the con-
gressional record. 132 Thus, even the conscientious member of 
Congress is in some sense a prisoner of the information he re-
128. Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the Meaning of the Mod-
ern State: Keep the Bathwater, But Throw Out That Baby. 87 CORNELL L. REV. 309, 322 
(2002) ("[l]deology. respect from colleagues, and the desire to act conscientiously have 
all been empirically confirmed as determinants of political behavior."); see also Lerner. 
supra note 109. at 629 (arguing that public choice theory is not incompatible with the 
idea of members of Congress envisioning themselves as members of the "public good"). 
129. See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport. Majority and Supermajority 
Rule: Three Views of the Capitol. 85 TEX. L. REv. 1115, 1160 (2007). 
130. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through 
Statutory Interpretation: an Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 230-31 (1986) 
(arguing that interest groups often control the flow of information to possibly unsuspect-
ing legislators). Legislative reforms also focus on the role of interest groups in political 
support and legislative fact-finding. See e.g. Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Po-
litical Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1567, 1626 (1988). 
131. Mancur Olson, Rational Ignorance, Professional Research, and Politicians' Di-
lemmas. in KNOWLEDGE, POWER AND THE CONGRESS 153 (William H. Robinson & 
Clay H. Wellborn eds., 1991). 
132. Devins, supra note 68, at 1184 ("[L)obbyists (as well as senior staffers) under-
stand that courts sometimes look towards legislative history and, consequently, that it is 
useful to pad the legislative history in ways that support their objectives.''). 
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ceives. In the unstructured legislative fact-finding process, inter-
est groups will shape the information stream that surrounds him. 
Second, even when a member of Congress bases his fact-
finding on more general sources of information not directly 
manufactured by special interests, like the facts contained in 
newspapers or on television, he faces the bias of the "availability 
heuristic." The availability heuristic shows "individuals will over-
estimate the likelihood of events that are more cognitively sali-
ent, or available to them, ignoring or undervaluing the relevant 
base rates of outcomes." 133 This heuristic is well documented in 
numerous psychology experiments. 134 For instance, when trying 
to establish the frequency of a kind of event or in weighing the 
cost and benefits of proposed legislation, a legislator will have a 
tendency to put disproportionate weight on the facts that are 
readily accessible or sa~ien~. Partic~larly _given the expandi~§ 
number of complex pohcy Issues with which Congress deals, · · 
even a well-meaning member will also be prompted to take this 
kind of mental shortcut. 
The availability heuristic of course also exists in ordinary 
citizens and thus can affect Congress indirectly as well as di-
rectly, since in this mixed model Congress responds in part to 
citizens' views of the facts. 13" Voters often respond to cognitively 
salient news items that are inflated by short bursts of intense 
media coverage. 137 For example, a federal carjacking law was en-
133. Russell B. Korobkin. Behavioral Analysis and Legal Reform: Rules vs. Stan-
dards Revisited. 79 OR. L. REV. 23. 49-50 (2000); see also Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sun-
stein. Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation. 51 STAN. L. REV. 683.685 (1999) (defin-
ing the availability heuristic as ··a pervasive mental shortcut whereby the perceived 
likelihood of any given event is tied to the ease with which its occurrence can be brought 
to mind''). 
134. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman. Availability: A Heuristic for Judg-
ing Frequency and Probability. in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND 
BIASES (Daniel Kahneman. Paul Slovic. & Amos Tversky eds .. 1982). 
135. Abner Mikva. How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 
61 N.C. L. REV. 587, 609 (1983) ("Because of the volume of legislation. the time spent 
with constituents. and the technical knowledge required to understand the background of 
every piece of legislation. it is infrequent that a member considers the individual merits 
of a particular bill."); see also Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design 
of a Thayerian Congress. 5 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1290 (2001) ("Despite the enormous growth 
of congressional staff and the refined specialization of its internal structure, Congress 
faces tight deliberative constraints of time and information."). 
136. Allen Schick. Informed Legislation: Policy Research versus Ordinary Knowl-
edge, in KNOWLEDGE, POWER AND THE CONGRESS 102 (1991) ("Contradictions be-
tween ordinary and research knowledge are not uncommon. Researchers often boast 
that their findings are counterintuitive .... In legislating. committees and members of 
Congress cannot ignore ordinary thinking because their election success depends on gar-
nering the votes of citizens who have no special expertise in policy matters.") 
137. Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 
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acted after a spurt of carjackings received national attention, de-
spite the fact that carjackings were already being prosecuted at 
the state level and the rate of carjackings was on the decline. 1'' 
This is quite probably an instance in which the availability heu-
ristic was at work, since carjackings on the news are much more 
available and vivid than lectures on the benefits of local crime 
being prosecuted at the local level in a federal system. 139 To take 
an example from Carhart, citizens could well believe that one 
particularly gruesome example of a partial-birth abortion that 
appeared medically unnecessary was representative of all par-
tial-birth abortions. 
Another important cognitive tendency affecting congres-
sional fact-finding is the confirmation bias. When a person has 
an initial hypothesis, he will be "prone to search for information 
that confirms the hypothesis, as well as to interpret information 
that he has as confirming the hypothesis." 1.j() On the assumption 
that members of Congress are generally motivated by ideology 
as well as an interest in reelection, they possess a strong set of 
beliefs about the way the world works. In fact, in a party system 
in particular, a strong set of priors is needed to get elected. 1 ~ 1 
Conwess' committee system mig~t en~oura~e ~gecialization, 1~c 
but It also exacerbates the confirmatiOn bias. · Members of 
Congress will bid for assignments on committees which govern 
policy they have particularly strong beliefs about, or that affect 
special interests influential in a congressman's home state. 1 ~ 
YALE L.J. 61. 86 (2002) (""When the media emphasizes particular incidents. those inci-
dents will become cognitively available. and hence they might seem to be far more prob-
able than they are in fact."). 
138. Rogovin. supra note 116. at 172-73. 
139. In contrast. voters are likely to ignore events if the effects of these events are 
diffused among the entire population and are thus individually small even if cumulatively 
large. 
140. Mark Seidenfeld. Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of 
Agency Rulemaking. 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486. 504 (2002). 
141. Closely related to the confirmation bias is the phenomenon of biased assimila-
tion. which "refers to the tendency of individuals to condition their acceptance of new 
information as reliable based on its conformity to their prior beliefs." Kahan & Braman. 
supra note 130. 
142. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 118. at 573-74 (arguing that the committee 
svstem makes it institutionally possible for Congress to overcome the limitations of lay 
~embership in making decisions). 
143. Devins. supra note 68. at 1183 (noting that "committee chairs can pack their 
committees with like minded thinkers. can determine when and what the committee in-
vestigates. and can arrange hearings in a way that frustrate the search for truth"). 
144. Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Con-
gress: or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are not Organized as Markets. 96 J. POL ECOI". 
132 (1988) ("committees are composed of members who are significantly above-average 
supporters of the relevant interest group"). 
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Therefore the factual findings made at the committee level will 
be particularly subject to the biases of members of Congress.'~' 
Accordingly, even when members of Congress focus on ob-
jectives other than reelection in their fact-finding, their psychol-
ogy interacts with the legislative fact-finding process in a way 
that undermines its reliability. 
C. SOCIAL FACT-FINDING BY THE JUDICIARY 
Of course it is not enough to show that Congress is an unre-
liable fact-finder on constitutional issues. We must also compare 
the reliability of judicial fact-finding with that of Congress. In 
this section, we show first that the structure of the judiciary sys-
tematically reduces the problems that beset congressional fact-
finding under either a public choice or behavioral economics 
model. Second, we respond to arguments that the judiciary has 
its own inherent defects that may nonetheless make it a worse 
finder of social facts than is Congress. 
Members of the judiciary have life tenure and therefore do 
not share the incentives of members of Congress to shape the 
relevant facts to enhance their electoral prospects. Moreover, 
judges' indifference to electoral pressures will make the judiciary 
less concerned about public opinion. As a result, the public's bi-
ases about facts-which, as we have shown above, may in some 
cases distort congressional fact-finding-are unlikely to have 
much effect. Accordingly, the pivotal influences in the public 
choice model that undermine the accuracy of fact-finding will be 
less present in the judicial than in the legislative context. 
Similarly, the defects of the fact-finding process under-
scored by our mixed model do not beset judicial fact-finding. 
Here the adversarial and disciplined nature of the litigation 
process rather than life tenure is responsible for superior judicial 
performance. First, interest groups will wield less influence with 
the judiciary.'46 Although interest groups do influence litigation 
through test cases and amicus briefs, the adversarial system will 
145. William H. Riker & Barry Weingast. Constitutional Regulation of Legislative 
Choice: The Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures. 74 VA. L. REV. 373, 387 
(1988) (noting that changes in committee agenda power produce dramatic swings in 
agency policy). 
146. Richard A. Epstein. The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of 
Public Choice Theory. 1990 BYU L. REV. 827. 833 (""Judges may not talk about pending 
business with any outsider: nor reveal privately the decision in any case prior to its dis-
closure to the immediate parties and the public: nor allow connection or money to (even 
appear to) influence the outcome of a case ... (citing Code of Judicial Conduct (1990)) ). 
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produce a more balanced view of the facts than the political 
processes of Congress. In litigation, each side has the incentive 
to get its facts into the record and discredit the facts put forward 
by opposing counsel. A congressman is usually provided only 
with facts that affect well coordinated interests groups; in litiga-
tion, however, every relevant fact is at least marginally more 
beneficial to one side of the dispute rather than the other. 147 
Concerns that would not be raised in the legislature- because 
they involve facts of which voters are rationally ignorant or in-
terests that are diffusely spread across the population-would be 
ferreted out by the parties. 
We recognize that interest groups might have more re-
sources at their disposal in litigation as well, but they cannot ef-
fectively out-lobby the opposition as they can in the legislative 
process.'4il An interest group can hire a top law firm only once, 
and even though they may outspend the other side, they face the 
same page limit on their briefs and the same amount of time for 
oral argument. 149 In economic terms, the marginal effectiveness 
of additional expenditures by interest groups is lower with the 
judiciary than with the legislature, because courts operate under 
tighter constraints on their decision-making process and with 
more barriers to interest group influence. 150 
The adversarial system also constrains the availability heu-
ristic and confirmation bias and makes such cognitive biases less 
problematic than they are in Congress. The adversarial system 
assures that evidence on both sides of a disputed factual issue 
will be heard, thus helping to diminish the power of the avail-
ability heuristic. Because of the structure of litigation, judges will 
also be less subject to the confirmation bias than legislators, as 
they cannot seek out the facts themselves, but must hear the 
facts presented by both sides before deciding an issue. Further-
147. This point tends to be ignored by critics who claim that the judiciary takes an 
undesirably narrow look at the facts because they are only deciding the narrow issue be· 
fore them. See DONALD HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 45-56 (1977). 
148. Thomas W. Merrill, Does Public Choice Theory Justify Judicial Activism After 
All?, 21 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 219, 228 (1997) ("the judicial supply curve becomes 
inelastic at much lower prices than the legislative supply curve"); A.C. Pritchard & Todd 
J. Zywicki, Finding the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of Tradition's Role in Consti-
tutional Interpretation, 77 N.C. L. REV. 409,499 (1999) ("money can be used to purchase 
high quality legal representation, but the structure of appellate litigation ... places im-
portant limits on the marginal benefit of money to an interest group."). 
149. Merrill, supra note 148, at 228. 
150. See John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 567 (2000) (describing the effects of different processes on the 
incentives of lobbying by interest groups). 
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more, judges are less prone to the confirmation bias because 
they are forced to address contrary facts in their opinion and ex-
plain why they are not relevant. If a judge ignores facts in the 
majority opinion, he will suffer the embarrassment of a strong 
dissenter (a factual "whistleblower") who points out an opin-
ion's factual flaws. 151 As many commentators have observed, 
concern about reputation and status among peers is a factor 
likely to affect judicial behavior. 152 Peer pressure and profes-
sional norms are more powerful in the judiciary than in Con-
gress, because judges make factual determinations in smaller 
groups and, as elite lawyers, share a greater core of professional 
0 153 
expenence. 
Against these substantial advantages in judicial fact-finding, 
commentators have suggested the judiciary is liable to several 
disadvantages. The most important argument is that the judici-
ary's insularity and lack of geographic and socioeconomic diver-
sity makes its social fact-finding less accurate than a more geo-
graphically dispersed and representative body like Congress.154 
This kind of argument against a judicial finding of social facts 
faces several difficulties. 
The argument that the greater diversity of experience and 
background of members of Congress make them a fact-finder 
superior to the judiciary tracks the familiar argument that the 
greater diversity of experience and background of members of 
the jury make them a fact-finder superior to the judiciary.1" But 
151. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller. Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to 
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals. 107 YALE L.J. 2155 
(1998). 
152. Pritchard & Zywicki. supra note 148. at 495: Richard A. Posner. What Do 
Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does). 3 SUP. Cr. 
ECON. REV. 1. 15 (1993) (noting that ··a potentially significant element in the judicial util-
ity function is reputation. both with other judges. especially one on the same court ... 
and with the legal profession at large."). 
153. Jonathan T. Molot. Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Struc-
tural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Powers over Statutory Interpretation, 96 Nw. U. 
L. REV. 1239. 1304--06 (2002) (arguing that judges "'are influenced by strong institutional 
norms that lead them to value consistency and stability more than officials in the political 
branches of the government.'" and discussing the role of shared professional experience). 
154. Archibald Cox. The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations. 40 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 199,209-10 (1971); see also Devins, supra note 68. at 1179 (citing Cox and 
MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 68 (1999)). 
155. Cf Andrew E. Taslitz, Temporal Adversarialism, Criminal Justice, and the 
Rehnquist Court: The Sluggish Life of Political Factfinding, 94 GEO. L.J. 1589, 1607 
(2006) ('"Diverse groups also bring more cultural information relevant to judging credi-
bility and are more likely to avoid error because every argument must survive group 
challenge. A judge does not face the same intellectual gauntlet in making his own fact-
findings."). 
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the jury is generally charged with finding adjudicative facts, 
whereas the legislature must find more general social facts. Ad-
judicative facts more often call for the application of the com-
mon sense of the community, as when a jury must infer individ-
ual intent from a welter of facts about an event or series of 
occurrences or must evaluate the credibility of witnesses from all 
walks of life. 1; 6 For such evaluations, it is quite clear that diver-
siry in experience and background will prove very useful. 
In contrast, social facts of the kind that support the constitu-
tionality of legislation more often comprehend impersonal and 
general data where inferences depend on techniques of objective 
analysis, including statistical inference, rather than evaluations 
of personal credibility. Here it is much less clear that diversity of 
experience and background are more useful than trainin¥ in the 
specific experience of evaluating this kind of evidence. 15 More-
over, the analysis needed to find social facts is becoming more 
complex and sophisticated. The exponentially increasing power 
of computers permits ever more comprehensive data collection 
and ever more intricate dissection of these data by mathematical 
techniques, like regression analysis. 158 Even if Congress were 
thought at some point to have had a comparative advantage akin 
to the jury in social fact-finding, the claim is less and less plausi-
ble in the modern era.159 
In any event, the central question about judicial social fact-
finding cannot simply be whether the relative insularity and so-
cioeconomically uniform character of the judiciary impedes its 
fact-finding, but whether it does so to a greater degree than in 
ordinary legal interpretation. After all, it is frequently noted that 
the judiciary's composition affects its interpretation of legal 
156. !d. at 1607-09. 
157. See Schick. supra note 136: see also Douglas J. Sylvester & Sharon Lohr. Count-
ing on Confidentiality: Legal and Statistical Approaches to Federal Privacy Law After the 
USA Patriot Act. 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1033. 1101 (arguing that congressional representa-
tives lack the training and expertise to avoid cognitive traps when dealing with statistics 
and certain other data). 
15R. See John 0. McGinnis. Age of the Empirical. 137 POLICY REVIEW (2006) (de-
scribing how computers are making empirical work increasingly important to law and 
social science). 
159. We recognize that juries evaluate complex statistical evidence in some cases. 
like those involving mass torts or monopolies. But it is in precisely these cases that com-
menta!ors have doubted that the jury is competent, and many in fact have suggested that 
such cases be tried by judges alone. See generally, e.g. Note. The Jury's Capacity to De-
cide Complex Civil Cases. 110 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (1997) (discussing a number of possi-
ble alterations to the trial fact-finding process). And these cases would still involve 
evaluating witness credibility about specific events-valuations largely absent in social 
fact- finding. 
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texts. Indeed, this criticism of judicial review has been heard 
since the early republic and remains a frequent staple of those 
who want to cast doubt on the wisdom of a particular judicial 
decision. 1h0 Yet, despite these complaints, our system provides 
for rigorous judicial review, and permits the Supreme Court to 
invalidate legislation of a branch with greater geographic and so-
cioeconomic diversity. If the judiciary, despite its insularity and 
uniformity, reviews Congress's reading of the Constitution's text 
in order to protect the Constitution's structure or the rights of 
minorities (or for whatever other reason judicial review is justi-
fied), one must show why a similar review of the social facts sup-
porting the constitutionality of legislation is not similarly neces-
sary to achieve those same goals. 
Indeed, social fact-finding would appear to be less influ-
enced by the characteristic judicial biases of insularity and socio-
economic uniformity than legal interpretation. For instance. 
fundamental rights jurisprudence permits the judiciary substan-
tial discretion to determine what rights should be protected. 1" 1 
The Court claims it looks at traditions in making those determi-
nations, but such assessments involve large measures of discre-
tion and thus can be seen as subject to bias. When socioeco-
nomic elites favored laissez-faire, the Supreme Court ruled in 
favor of economic liberties,1"2 and now when elites favor sexual 
autonomy, the Court rules in favor of rights to abortion and 
same-sex conduct. 163 Compared to these kinds of determinations, 
the evaluation of data necessary to establish social facts appears 
to involve less, not more discretion, and thus is less subject to the 
biases of greater social uniformity.164 Thus, when such factual de-
terminations are as necessary to evaluating the questions of a 
160. See Anthony Champagne. The Politics of Criticizing Judges. 39 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 839 (2006) (arguing that recent attacks on the judiciary frequently pit religion 
against liberal ideology). 
161. See Nelson Lund & John 0. McGinnis. Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris. 
102 MICH. L. REV. 1555. 1575 (2004). 
162. See Stephen M. Feldman. Unenumerated Rights in Different Democratic Re-
gimes. 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 47. 86 (2006) (observing that elites during the Lochner era 
used the judicial system to protect their economic interests). 
163. /d. at 86-1\7 (after Lochner. "[elites) still sought to protect their interests and 
values through judicial enforcement of non-economic rights"). 
164. David L. Faigman. "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the 
Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation. 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541. 606 (1991) 
("Science has one main advantage over the other sources of interpretation: replicabilitv. 
The validity of hypotheses about the world of constitutional facts does not depend on 
'plain meaning.' the materials discovered in historical archives. logical argument. or 
moral persuasion. The validity of a factual statement depends on its amenability to test-
ing."). -
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statute's constitutionality as are other legal issues, the case for an 
independent judicial role is no more weakened by the judiciary's 
insularity and socioeconomic uniformity than are other aspects 
of judicial review. 
Other typical attacks on the impartiality of the judiciary are 
similarly less persuasive in the area of social fact-finding. For ex-
ample, some might argue that the Supreme Court has become so 
"politicized" that the Justices cannot be relied on to be any less 
biased than Congress when it comes to finding facts. But any 
real or perceived political biases manifest themselves as much in 
traditional legal interpretation. For instance, many commenta-
tors argued that the Court's change in composition between the 
Stenberg decision, which struck down Nebraska's ban on partial-
birth abortion, and the Carhart decision which upheld Con-
gress's ban, drove the difference in result. 165 Even if this is the 
case, it does not appear to be the result of biased fact-finding. In 
Carhart both the majority and the dissenters seemed to agree 
that some of the Congress's factual finding were incorrect.166 The 
majority did not take the position that partial-birth abortions 
were never medically necessary, but rather found that the an-
swer to the question was uncertain. 167 The majority concluded 
that Congress should be accorded deference on a matter of fac-
tual uncertainty, while the dissenters argued that this uncertainty 
should weigh in favor of protecting the health of the mother, 
which was the majority's view in Stenberg. 161'. Thus it was the Jus-
tices' views on the legal standard to be applied in reviewing 
Congress, rather than their interpretation of the statistical evi-
dence, that resulted in the departure from Stenberg. Even if one 
thinks that the majority opinion was result oriented, the Justices 
in the majority were more intellectually honest than Congress 
about the legislative facts. 
165. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky. Turning Sharply to the Right, 10 GREEN BAG 2d 
423. 425 (2007) ('"The key to the (Carhart decision] was not in the difference in wording 
between the federal law and the Nebraska act: it was Justice Alita having replaced Jus-
tice O'Connor."). 
166. Carhart. 127 S. Ct. at 1637-38: id. at 1643-1644 (Ginsburg, L dissenting). 
167. Carhart. 127 S. Ct. at 1636. 
168. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 937 ("(T]he division of medical opinion about the matter 
at most means uncertainty. a factor that signals the presence of risk. not its absence .... 
the uncertainty means a significant likelihood that those who believe that D & X is a 
safer abortion method in certain circumstances may turn out to be right. If so. then the 
absence of a health exception will place women at an unnecessary risk of tragic health 
consequences."): Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1643. 1647 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (reiterating 
this aspect of Stenberg and arguing that "the procedures [the Court now] deem(s] accept-
able might put a woman's health at greater risk"). 
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Other scholars have focused less on the biases of the judici-
ary and more on the judicial process itself as a constraint on 
sound decision-making. For instance, it has been noted that the 
judicial process has trouble capturing the multiple perspectives 
that best map reality, because in some cases there may be more 
plausible positions than there are litigants, and yet the adversar-
ial process highlights only the positions of the plaintiff and de-
fendant.169 But, as we noted above, the committees of Congress 
function as gatekeepers that may often neglect or limit the expo-
sition of a salient contending position. In any event, the judiciary 
permits amicus briefs to represent positions different from those 
advanced by the plaintiff or defendant. 170 In important constitu-
tional litigation, the filing of amicus briefs has been on the rise.171 
It has also been argued the adversarial process encourages 
courts to hear only the facts that are relevant to the parties at 
hand, leaving them under-informed about "the systematic and 
prospective consequences of their decisions." 172 But this assumes 
that courts ignore the consequences of their decisions. It is ques-
tionable whether this is the case, particularly in constitutional 
litigation. When a constitutional doctrine requires the Court to 
find and weigh social facts, such as whether partial-birth abor-
tion is ever necessary, the doctrine itself factors in the conse-
quences of the Court's decision.173 Moreover, important long 
term consequences of constitutional decisions, even if not imme-
diately connected to the parties, will support one side of the dis-
pute, and thus are likely to be raised in argument. 
169. Einer Elhauge. Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Re-
view?, 101 YALE L.J. 31.78 (1990). 
170. The amicus brief has long been permitted in order to preserve the interests of 
affected third parties. See Nancy Bage Sorenson. The Ethical Implications of Amicus 
Briefs: A Proposal for Reforming Rule II of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. 30 
ST. MARY'S L.J. 1219. 1224--28 (1999) (describing the history and purpose of the amicus 
brief from Roman through modern times). 
171. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill. The Influence of Amicus Curiae 
Briefs on the Supreme Court. 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743. 749-50 (2000). ("While the number 
of cases the Court has disposed of on the merits has not increased appreciably during 
[the last 50 years] .... the number of amicus filings has increased by more than 800%."). 
As we note in Section 4(8)(1). infra. amicus briefs must be presented at the district court 
level to the extent that they introduce legislative facts into evidence. so that parties will 
have an opportunity to rebut the facts submitted by the opposition. 
172. Elhauge. supra note 169. at 78 
173. Another objection may be that courts do not have the specialization found in 
congressional committees. But as we noted above. committee specialization may have 
more negative than positive effects. 
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D. DEPARTMENTALISM AND CONGRESSIONAL 
FACT-FINDING 
In the previous two sections, we have argued that judicial 
finding of social facts is likely to be better than legislative fact-
finding. The evidence we have adduced also supports the weaker 
claim that the judicial finding of social facts has peculiar 
strengths that legislative fact-finding lacks. Here we show that 
departmentalism turns even this weaker claim into a compelling 
argument that the Constitution itself contemplates independent, 
de novo judicial finding of social facts. 
Departmentalism is the view that each branch of the gov-
ernment has coordinate responsibilities to assess the constitu-
tionality of legislation. Accordingly, a member of the legislature 
should determine whether the legislation for which he votes is 
constitutional. 174 Likewise, the President should decide whether 
legislation is constitutional in deciding whether to affix his signa-
ture to a bill or to veto it. 175 In this regard, judicial review is not a 
special power vouchsafed by the United States Constitution to 
the judiciary, but, as Marbury v. Madison itself suggests, a preex-
isting requirement for judges to determine which is the control-
ling law in the context of a case. 17" The introduction of the Con-
stitution simply means that the Constitution now provides the 
body of law controlling over any statute, and Congress and the 
President as well as the judiciary thus measure legislation against 
the Constitution in the course of their duties. 177 
In the past decade, departmentalism has gained substantial 
acceptance among academics. 17H The reasons are both formal and 
pragmatic. Formally, no express clause of the Constitution sin-
gles out one branch or the other for exclusive responsibility of 
constitutional assessment. Indeed, members of all branches take 
an oath to uphold the Constitution. 179 Moreover, the Framers 
174. See Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo. Against Interpretative Supremacy. 103 
MICH. L. REV. 1539. 1556 (2005) (noting responsibility of member of Congress to assess 
constitutionality of legislation). 
175. See Michael B. Rappaport. The Unconstitutionality of Signing and Not En fore· 
ing. 16 WM. & MY. BILL RTS. J. 113 (2007). 
176. Marburv. 5 U.S. at 177-78 (1803). 
177. See Neison Lund. Presidential Signing Statements in Perspective. 16 WM. & 
MARY BILL OF RIGHTS 1. 95 (2007). 
178. See Brian Galle. The Justice of Administration: Judicial Responses to Executive 
Claims of Independent Authority to Interpret the Constitution. 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 157. 
160 (2005) (outlining the consensus and describing academic opponents of departmenta-
lism as "few" in number). 
179. See U.S. CONST. art VI ("The Senators and Representatives before men-
tioned ... and all the executive officers and judicial officers ... of the United States shall 
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themselves appeared to believe that the three branches had co-
ordinate duties in constitutional interpretation. 11'" These argu-
ments apply to judicial review in social fact-finding: if social facts 
are relevant to constitutionality, nothing in the Constitution de-
prives the judiciary of the obligation to treat the Constitution as 
paramount by ascertaining for itself that relevant facts support 
the constitutionality of the legislation.1x1 
Departmentalism also has some pragmatic advantages. Be-
cause each branch should assess for itself whether legislation is 
constitutional, the rights of the people have multiple protections. 
Moreover, the disagreement among the branches raises the sali-
ence of the issue to the people and helps bring the debate over 
constitutional principle to their attention. As Justice James Wil-
son stated, "[t]here is not in the whole science of politicks a 
more solid or a more important maxim than this-that of all 
governments, those are the best, which, by the natural effect of 
their constitutions, are frequently renewed or drawn back to 
their first principles. "1x2 In this way, departmentalism in fact-
finding would be an additional security for rights and structures 
and provide a mechanism for involving the people themselves in 
constitutional discourse about relevant social facts when the 
branches disagree. 1x3 
be bound by Oath or Affirmation to support this Constitution"). The President must 
take an ''oath to preserve. protect and defend the Constitution of the United States". see 
U.S. CONST. art. II. sec. 1. If obligation were measured by an oath's definitiveness. the 
President's obligation to enforce the Constitution would be the most substantial. 
IRO. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of All!ono-
mous Execlllive Branch lmerpretation. 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81. R4 (1993) (quoting his-
torical evidence). 
181. To be sure. the contours of departmentalism are not well-defined. because 
there is disagreement about the scope of the duties of the respective branches in constitu-
tional interpretation. Some scholars, for instance. argue that the President has a duty not 
to follow even orders of the Supreme Court itself. when he believes that those orders are 
not constitutionally grounded. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: 
The Execlllive Power to Say What the Law Is. 83 GEO. L.J. 217. 343 (1994). Many dis-
agree. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill. Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explana-
tions for ludgmellls. 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43. 56 ( 1993). But no one disputes the content 
of social facts are relevant. indeed essential. to determining the constitutionality of some 
kinds of legislation. Nor does anyone dispute that deciding a case-the context in which 
the judiciary will engage in independent fact-finding-is within the core of judicial re-
view. 
1112. JAMES WILSON. I WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 290-91 (Robert Green 
McCloskey ed .. 1907). 
1R3. Although we have observed that the general public has little incentive to ascer-
tain legislative facts because of rational ignorance and rational irrationalitv. to the extent 
that inter-branch disagreement brings disputed facts to public attention th~t. of course. is 
a desirable result. 
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Departmentalism possesses these advantages even when all 
the branches have similar institutional structures for constitu-
tional assessment. But if the branches have different capacities 
and thus different strengths and weaknesses, departmentalism 
has the additional advantage of bringing to bear different per-
spectives that would be lost in a unitary system of interpretation. 
Some commentators have noted that the political branches have 
complementary capacities to the judicial branch in legal inter-
pretation.184 For instance, the judiciary excels in formal reason-
ing, whereas the political branches with their greater popular in-
put may be more sensitive to analogous reasoning. 185 
Whatever one's view of whether the legislature or the fed-
eral judiciary is the better finder of social fact, it is clear from the 
discussion above that the judiciary at least possesses certain ad-
vantages. Its insulation and disciplined adversarial process focus 
a searchlight along wavelengths that Congress or state legislators 
cannot hope to replicate. Its distinctive strengths provide yet an-
other reason that the departmental perspective makes as much 
sense in fact-finding as in pure legal interpretation.1H6 
Departmentalism also shows why a legislature's decision 
expressly to find social facts in support of a statute's constitu-
tionality should not displace the judiciary's independent role any 
more than the judiciary's role would be displaced by Congress's 
legal interpretations. Congress is to be commended if its mem-
bers offer a serious defense of their legal interpretation of the 
Constitution to show that their legislation is constitutional. In 
subsequent litigation, the government would surely draw such 
legislative opinions to the judiciary's attention so the judges 
could adopt any of the legislature's legal arguments that they be-
lieved sound. In this context, few would suggest that a legislative 
184. See Jerry L. Mashaw. Norms, Practices and the Paradox of Deference: A Pre-
liminary Investigation into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REv. 501, 524-
25 (2005) (observing that administrative agencies interpret legislation for different pur-
poses and using different methods than does the judiciary). See also John 0. McGinnis. 
Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney General: A Normative, Descriptive, and 
Historical Prolegomenon. 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 375. 398--99 (1993) (suggesting executive 
branch interpretation has methodology in some measure distinct from judiciary). 
185. McGinnis. supra note 184, at 398--99. 
186. It is true as well that most scholars believe that departmentalism permits one 
branch of the government to follow the precedent minted by other branches. Thus. in the 
vetoing a bill. the President can consider Supreme Court case Jaw in deciding whether it 
is constitutional. and need not rely on his own view as if he were writing on a clean slate. 
See Lund, supra note 177. at 105. The issue for independent judicial fact-finding. at least 
in the first instance. however, does not concern precedent. The question is whether the 
judiciary should take an independent view of social facts relating to a statute whose con-
stitutionality has not been previously determined. 
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legal opinion should diminish the judiciary's independent legal 
interpretive role. Similarly, Congress's decision to find facts un-
covers a quarry from which the government may draw the facts 
necessary to construct a defense of the statute, but hardly sug-
gests the judiciary should take its own fact-finding responsibili-
ties less seriously. 
Another structural reason that the judiciary should engage 
in de novo review is that it is the branch to which the other 
branches can most easily respond if it systematically abuses its 
power or makes inaccurate findings. Article III of the Constitu-
tion provides the Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction 
"both as to Law and to Fact" but permits Congress to make "ex-
ceptions" to that jurisdiction. 1H7 Congress can make its displeas-
ure known by using the exceptions clause to strip the Supreme 
Court of its jurisdiction to find facts.'&< It also has the power of 
the purse which it can use to cut off funds for desired judicial 
proj ects.'H9 
In contrast, the Court has no way to check errant congres-
sional fact-finding other than to engage in its own fact-finding to 
see if Congress is getting the facts right. Deferential review will 
not accommodate this goal as Congress would have substantial 
discretion to be inaccurate so long as it was not patently or 
grossly so. Thus, the potential error correction implicit in the 
Constitution's system of checks and balances also supports inde-
pendent judicial review, because in the long run there is a lesser 
risk of unchecked error in independent review than in judicial 
deference. Thus, overall accountability will be strengthened by 
de novo judicial review of social fact-finding.'<)() 
187. See U.S. CONST. art. III.§ 2 (""The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdic-
tion both as to Law and Fact. with such exceptions. and under such Regulations as Con-
gress shall make."') 
188. It is true that the exercise of power by Congress would continue to allow lower 
courts to find facts. but the use of the exception clause would send a strong message to 
the entire judiciary. For a discussion of the positive impact of public criticism (including 
jurisdiction-stripping threats) on judicial restraint and independence. see Viet D. Dinh. 
Threats to Judicial Independence, Real and Imagined. 95 GEO. L.J. 929 (2007). 
189. See Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson. Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme 
Court Decisionmaking. 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1437. 1466--67 (2001) (discussing Congress' 
power of the purse and the use of that power to punish the Warren Court). 
190. We have already discussed the reason that the public at large cannot be counted 
upon to hold Congress accountable for inaccurate fact-finding. See notes 119-127 and 
accompanying text. 
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E. AGAINST VARYING THE TREATMENT OF 
CONGRESSIONAL FACT-FINDING 
[Vol. 25:69 
A few commentators suggest that the Court should vary its 
deference to congressional fact-finding depending either on the 
expertise of Congress in an area of law or on the incentives it has 
to get the facts right. An example of the first kind of argument 
comes from recent commentary on the Court's 2006-2007 term, 
where Professor Kermit Roosevelt complained in passing that 
the Court deferred to Congress in the partial-birth abortion case 
where Congress had no medical expertise but did not defer to 
Congress on campaign finance reform where it has political ex-
pertise.191 Professor Neal Devins has argued that the Court 
should defer to Congress in certain separation of powers cases 
where Congress has incentives to get the facts rights because it 
does not face pressures for inaccuracy from special interest 192 groups. 
We are skeptical of such arguments. First, varying the level 
of deference depending on a list of factors complicates constitu-
tional doctrine and is an invitation to ad hoc, result-oriented ju-
risprudence. Second, as we have noted, under a departmentalist 
view of the Constitution the virtues of one branch's mode of 
constitutional interpretation do not suggest that the other 
branches should abandon their own modes if those have distinc-
tive virtues. 193 But most importantly, the models of congressional 
behavior that we have offered show that the distinctions be-
tween subject matter areas have little basis. 
First, the institutional structures on which Congress relies, 
such as committee hearings, do not depend on the experience of 
individual members of Congress. Committee hearings can take 
evidence from experts in medicine and campaign finance alike. 
It is true that members of Congress will have more experience in 
the area of campaign finance than in medicine, because all have 
run for election and few are doctors. But greater familiarity with 
an issue is as likely to lead to worse, not better, accuracy in fact-
finding. First, it exacerbates the availability heuristic: members 
of Congress will give greater weight to experiences that have 
191. See Kermit Roosevelt. How to Judge the Robert's Court. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MO~ITOR.July 6. 2007. at 3. 
192. See Devins. supra note 68, at 1189-92; see also David A. Strauss. Miranda. The 
Constirution. and Congress. 99 MICH. L. REV. 958. 973 (2001) (arguing that Congress 
should be given varying deference on constitutional questions based on an ··assessment 
of Congress's own capacities and propensities.''). 
193. See notes 174-189 and accompanying text. 
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happened to them, finding facts by personal anecdote rather 
than objective evidence. 1 ~4 Second, greater personal experience 
tends to translate into greater personal stakes and the potential 
for greater bias. Campaign finance is the best possible example 
of this: members of Congress as incumbents have important 
stakes in t~e o_utc?l1_1~ a_nd obvious bi~ses in findi~~ facts that 
support legislative m1tlat1ves to protect mcumbency. · 
Professor Devins' arguments about Congress' incentives in 
separation of powers cases are more sophisticated but they also 
do not persuade that judges should sometimes defer to congres-
sional fact-finding. Professor Devins's prime example is Con-
gress's line item veto. 196 It is not entirely clear what facts Con-
gress found to serve as a predicate for the constitutionality of 
that statute, but Professor Devins argues that Congress had 
strong incentives to get the facts rights at least in the long run, 
because they would have institutional incentives to react to the 
President's use of the line item statute and modify the legislation 
• 197 
m response. 
One possibility is that this is again not an argument about 
deference to fact-finding, but about deference due in a particular 
area of law. Given that the institutional clash between the Presi-
dent and Congress in the separation of powers area may lead to 
a plausible equilibrium, perhaps the Court should be loath to in-
tervene on the facts or the law. Like those relying on the politi-
cal safeguards to argue against intervention in federalism cases, 
other commentators have advanced this argument. 19s But if the 
view is that there something distinctive about congressional fact-
finding in the separation of powers that call for deference, our 
analysis would suggest otherwise. 
For instance, even if no special interest is involved in the 
line-item veto, the public's mistaken view of federal spending 
constrains congressional action. For instance, the public believes 
that foreign aid is twenty-four percent of the budget when it is in 
reality only one percent. 199 Entitlement spending in fact makes 
194. For discussion of the availability heuristic. see supra notes 137-139. and accom-
panying text. 
195. See, e.g .. Frank B. Cross. The Judiciarv and Public Choice. 50 HASTINGS L.J. 
355. 356--57 ( 1999); cf Schick Sllpra note 136. · 
196. Devins. supra note 68. at 1190. 
197. /d. 
198. See, e.g .. Choper. supra note 89. at 169-70. 314-15 (concluding the Court 
should. as in federalism cases. leave separation of powers to the superior political proc-
ess). 
199. See Caplan. supra note 122. at 79-80. 
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up the bulk of the federal budget, but it would not have been 
subject to the line item veto.200 Such mistaken views of the social 
facts may make the public incorrectly perceive the balance be-
tween the utility of the line item veto in cutting spending and the 
additional power it gives to the President to pressure members 
of Congress on spending and nonspending matters. Similarly, the 
availability heuristic gives the public a mistaken idea about the 
importance of pork barrel spending. The "bridge to nowhere" 
attracted more attention than sober analyses of the need to con-
trol entitlements. 201 These kinds of influences on the congres-
sional fact-finding process will undermine accuracy and seem 
unlikely to change over time. 
As we have shown in this section, there are a number of 
powerful arguments for an independent, de novo review of so-
cial or legislative facts in constitutional cases. We now make a 
preliminary inquiry into how the judiciary should go about find-
ing those facts. 
IV. HOW SHOULD THE COURT FIND LEGISLATIVE 
FACTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL CASES? 
In his famous 1923 treatise on evidence, John Henry Wig-
more wrote: 
When a legislative act is argued to be unconstitutional, and this 
is to depend upon the reasonableness, or the lack of possible 
reasonableness, of the law in its purpose or operation, and 
thus the external facts furnishing the possible legislative mo-
tive or the possible actual effect must be considered, this inci-
dental question is not for the jury but for the court. ... But by 
what theory or method shall the Court .... receive informa-
200. The Line Item Veto Act of 1996 empowered the President to cancel new 
"direct spending." or entitlements, but did not extend that power to existing entitlement 
spending. See Pub. L. No. 104-130. 110 Stat. 1200, §§ 1021(a), 1026. 2 U.S.C.A. § 691 
(West 2006). 
201. Alaska's "bridge to nowhere" commanded a prominent position in George 
Stephanopoulos's Feb. 10. 2006 20/20 presentation; available at http://abcnews.go.com/ 
Video/playerlndex?id=1604124; Jerry Bowen climbed that stump for 60 Minutes by Au-
gust 18th that year. Available at http://www.cbsnews.com/sections/i_ video/main500251. 
shtml?channel=60Sunday (search "bridge to nowhere"). The print media did not miss 
the opportunity to comment. See, e.g, William Safire, Bridge to Nowhere, N.Y. TI!'1ES, 
Oct. 8, 2006; Nick Jans, Alaska Thanks You, USA TODAY, May 17, 2005; Shailagh 
Murray, For Senate Foe of Pork Barrel Spending, Two Bridges Too Far, THE 
WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 21, 2005 (and circulated in newspapers nationwide as an Asso-
ciated Press article). 
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tion of the alleged facts? That is an interesting inquiry, hith-
..,o.., 
erto not carefully worked out by the courts.--
This "interesting in,~uiry" has still . not be~n carefully 
worked out by the courts: · Indeed, as we discussed m Part I, the 
Supreme Court has been inconsistent in its finding of social facts 
and certainly has not set out a procedural framework for such 
judicial fact-finding. In this section, we offer such a framework, 
drawing on our analysis in previous sections and on established 
rules of judicial procedure. Given our view that the Court should 
find social facts in the same manner regardless of congressional 
fact-finding, this framework should apply whether or not Con-
gress has expressly found facts. 
Our framework is guided by two considerations. First, we 
seek procedures that maximize the advantages of judicial fact-
finding discussed above- the transparency, discipline, and ad-
versarial nature that contributes to the fairness of the process 
and the accuracy of the results. Second, we must nevertheless as-
sure that these procedures take account of the reality that estab-
lishing social facts, unlike establishing adjudicative facts, creates 
precedents and affects many beyond those who are party to the 
case. 
First, we consider the burden of proof in social fact-finding. 
We argue that where doctrine makes a social fact relevant to the 
constitutionality of the statute, the government always should 
shoulder the burden of proof. This requirement should apply 
even in cases where the constitutional standard of scrutiny is 
very lenient, such as those reviewing economic legislation. The 
government has access to facts and it is too difficult to require a 
plaintiff to prove a negative. But in cases with a lenient standard 
of review, that standard will allow the government to prevail 
with very little evidence. 
Second, we move from the relation of the government to 
the judiciary in social fact-finding to the relation of the Supreme 
Court to the lower courts. Lower courts possess an advantage 
over the Supreme Court in fact-finding. They are well-suited to 
preside over the assembly of a factual record and the examina-
202. JOHN HENRY WJG~ORE. 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2555(d) (2d ed. 1923) 
(emphasis in the original). 
203. Jeffrey M. Shaman, Constitutional Fact: The Perception of Reality by the Su-
preme Court, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 236. 237 (1983) ("Throughout its history. the Court has 
devoted little attention to developing proper methodology to deal with constitutional 
facts."). 
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tion and cross examination of relevant witnesses. Accordingly. 
lower courts should identify factual matters necessary to resolv-
ing constitutional disputes and assure that its factual determina-
tions on these matters are made only after giving the parties the 
opportunity to elicit all relevant evidence. 
On the other hand, unlike the determination of adjudica-
tory facts. the determination of social facts potentially estab-
lishes broad rules for the future. Social facts represent social au-
thority no less than legal interpretations that become precedent. 
As a result, first appellate courts and then the Supreme Court 
must be able to review the facts de novo to protect their author-
ity to establish precedent vis-a-vis lower courts in the judicial hi-
erarchy. Nevertheless, appellate courts should confine them-
selves to the records made below (as supplemented by remands) 
to provide fairness to the parties. Such a process ensures greater 
accuracy by eschewing evidence that has not been tested in an 
adversarial process. 
Third, we end by considering the relation of the social fact-
finding of a current Supreme Court and the social facts found in 
its past decisions. Because social facts constitute judgments es-
tablishing ongoing social authority, they can have the effect of 
precedent. But the world changes and as a result the social facts 
underlying constitutional judgment themselves change. As a 
general matter, we believe that parties challenging social facts 
previously embedded in Supreme Court judgments bear the 
burden of showing that the factual findings are no longer true 
before these social judgments can be upended. 
A. BURDEN OF PROOF 
The Court has not made clear the burden of proof with re-
gard to social facts that are necessary to decide constitutional 
cases. Kenneth Culp Davis once dramatically illustrated the 
Court's inconsistency in assigning the burden of proof. In Paris 
Adult Theater v. Slaton, the Court put the burden of proof on the 
petitioner to disprove that pornography had adverse secondary 
effects."().! The Court cited a minority report (that only two mem-
bers of a nineteen member commission signed) to support the 
legislative finding that there was "a connection between antiso-
cial behavior and obscene material.""05 In Carey v. Population 
204. 413 u.s. 49 (1973). 
205. /d. at 60--61. 
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Services International, the Court put the burden on the govern-
ment to show that "limiting access to contraceptives will in fact 
substantially discourage early sexual behavior. .. coo In its decision 
striking down the law, the Court cited six studies indicating that 
there was no deterrent effect.c07 As Professor Davis observed, 
Paris and Carey were decided without "relating the second case 
to the first, and without mention in either opinion of any case 
law about allocation of the burden."20~ 
Even apart from such gross inconsistencies, the burden of 
proof for social facts is a constitutional crazy quilt. In strict scru-
tiny cases, the burden of proof is generally placed on the gov-
ernment. In some intermediate scrutiny cases involving gender 
the Court places the burden on the government.2'"' But in First 
Amendment intermediate scrutiny cases the Court often takes 
the government at its word.c 10 In rational basis cases, however, it 
is always clear that the burden is not on the government but the 
challenger of the law,211 and the Court can even fabricate a ra-
tional basis on the government's behalf.212 
The Court can avoid such inconsistencies in the future by 
placing the burden of proof for social fact-finding on the ~ov­
ernment as an explicit element of its constitutional doctrine.- 13 It 
206. 431 u.s. 678.695 (1977). 
207. /d. at 695-96 n.l9. In the same footnote. however. the Court upheld its tradition 
of citing evidence and then declaring it irrelevant. stating that "the studies ... play no 
part in our decision ... /d. 
208. Kenneth Culp Davis. Facts in Lawmaking. 80 COLLIM. L. REV. 931.939 (1980). 
209. See, e.g .. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan. 458 U.S. 718. 724 (1982) 
("[T]he party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their 
gender must carry the burden of showing an 'exceedingly persuasive· justification for the 
classification"). 
210. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres. Inc .. 475 U.S. 41. 51 (1986) ("The First 
Amendment does not require a city before enacting such an ordinance. to conduct new 
studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated by other cities. so 
long as whatever t:vidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to 
the problem that the city addresses."): Clark v. Comty. for Creative Non-Violence. 468 
U.S. 288 (1984) (granting the government's contention that administrative difficulties 
would result if protest groups were allowed to camp overnight on the national mall). 
211. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley. 440 U.S. 93. 111 (1979) ("In an equal protection case 
of this type [involving age discrimination] .... those challenging the legislative judgment 
must convince the court that the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently 
based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decision-
maker.") 
212. Williamson v. Lee Optical. 348 U.S. 483. 487 (1955) ("The legislature might 
have concluded that the frequency of occasions when a prescription is necessary was suf-
ficient to justify this regulation of the fitting of eyeglasses."). 
213. The single exception to this rule occurs when plaintiffs challenge a social fact 
found in a case that is controlling precedent: as we discuss below. the party challenging 
the factual underpinning in the previous case has the burden of proof. 
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will prevent citizens from having the often insurmountable bur-
den of proving a negative by showing that some government in-
terest does not exist. It will provide greater certainty in law and 
procedure, and greater transparency in the Court's decision 
making. In combination with the other recommendations made 
in the section, it will help bring judiciary out of the "black box" 
that hides its weighing of legislative facts. 214 
The effect of the burden of proof will vary, depending on 
what the government is required to prove. For instance, in chal-
lenges to economic regulations, the Court has made clear that 
the right to due process means only that the legislature must 
have a 'rational basis' for its legislation. 215 Even if the burden of 
proof is on the government, its burden is only to show that there 
is a rational basis for the policy. Thus, the government can meet 
this burden even in the face of very substantial and even pre-
dominant evidence that this legislation will not meet its objec-
tive. Accordingly, challenges to this kind of legislation will gen-
erally be defeated in early stages as soon as the government 
gives any rational justification for the law.216 
In cases requiring a more searching scrutiny, the govern-
ment should show that the requisite factual predicate for the leg-
islation is more likely than not to be the case. For instance, if 
keeping children from seeing indecency on the Internet is a 
compelling justification for imposing restrictions on First 
Amendment rights, the government must shoulder the burden of 
proving that those restrictions keep children from seeing inde-
h I 217 cency on t e nternet. 
Accordingly, it is important to carefully describe the social 
fact that the constitutional doctrine at issue requires to be 
proven, because the burden of proof will have more or less bite 
depending on what is required to be proved. For instance, in 
214. Aleinikoff, supra note 16, at 976. 
215. See Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 487-88 (1955); see also Kelo v. City of New Lon-
don, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (Justice Kennedy concurring and citing the doctrine 
of rational basis scrutiny for economic regulation). 
216. Even if every law passes this test, the ones that are truly absurd will be exposed 
as such by the government's strained attempts to plead a rational basis. For instance, 
when the Filled Milk Statute upheld in United States v. Carotene Products, 304 U.S. 144 
(1938), was later struck by a district court in 1972, the government declined to appeal the 
case, perhaps out of the belief that the law was not worth preserving. See Milnot Co. v. 
Richardson, 350 F. Supp. 221, 225 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (striking the Filled Milk Statute and 
declaring it "devoid of rationality"). 
217. Reno, 521 U.S. at 876; see also Federal Elections Comm. v. Wisconsin Right to 
Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2669-70 (2007) (government bears the burden of showing that 
the law targets candidate endorsement rather than legitimate discussion of issues). 
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Gonzales v. Carhart, the courts below appeared to believe the 
Court's previous decision on the same issue in Stenberg required 
the government to prove that partial-birth abortions were never 
medically necessary in order for the prohibition be constitu-
tional.218 But the Supreme Court required only that it be uncer-
tain whether partial-birth abortion is ever medically necessary 
for the government to prevail.219 Even if the government must 
shoulder the burden of proof in both instances, it is obviously 
much easier to prove that it is uncertain that partial-birth abor-
tions are ever medically necessary than it is to prove that they 
are never medically necessary. Clarifying the burden of proof 
may thus prompt clarifications in doctrine by requiring the judi-
ciary to focus more clearly on what social facts must be proved. 
B. PROCEDURES FOR FINDING SOCIAL F ACfS 
The Supreme Court has never made clear the appropriate 
procedures for finding social facts in the federal judicial system. 
In this subsection, we offer a sketch of rules that would maxi-
mize the judiciary's advantages in finding social facts and yet 
recognize their distinctive role as social authority with preceden-
tial effect. To that end, the lower courts should identify the so-
cial facts necessary to resolving constitutional litigation, compile 
a record for establishing those facts, and make their factual de-
terminations on that record. Appellate courts, including the Su-
preme Court, should then review de novo the factual determina-
tions of the lower courts to preserve the precedential authority 
of these facts. But they should not go beyond the record that 
lower courts have established. Remands are always available for 
the creation of a record necessary to establish facts that the ap-
pellate courts deem necessary to resolve the constitutional dis-
pute at issue. 
1. The essential role of lower courts. 
In our judicial system, trial courts take the lead in finding 
adjudicative facts, because they possess a greater capacity to 
identify the potentially many facts that are legally relevant, to 
218. See Carhart v. Gonzalez, 413 F. 3d 791, 796 (8th Cir 2005) ("Thus, when 'sub-
stantial medical authority' supports the medical necessity of a procedure in some in-
stances, a health exception is constitutionally required."). 
219. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1638 ("The Act is not invalid on its face where there is 
uncertainty over whether the barred procedure is ever necessary to preserve a woman's 
health."). 
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hold evidentiary hearings to establish those facts, and to develop 
evidence and findings for appellate review.220 Trial courts have 
similar advantages in finding social facts but only if they estab-
lish these facts by gathering evidence and not by judicial no-
tice.221 
Currently, Section 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
sharply limits judicial notice of adjudicative facts to those "(1) 
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial 
court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by re-
sort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be ques-
tioned."''' When the court takes judicial notice, a party must be 
~iv~~ an o~portunity to be heard "as to the P!opri~!J of ~aking 
JUdicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed." - While the 
Advisory Committee explicitly excluded legislative facts from 
these rules,''~ there is no reason that the Supreme Court cannot 
use them as guidelines for when evidentiary hearings are re-
quired to resolve disputes about social facts relevant to litigation 
at hand. Accordingly, when a federal district court first enter-
tains constitutional litigation, it should work with the parties to 
identify the salient social facts that are necessary to establish the 
constitutionality of the legislation being litigated.225 If these facts 
can be reasonably contested, the court should hold evidentiary 
hearings and provide each party a right to call witnesses and be 
heard on the factual issue. It should take judicial notice only of 
social facts that cannot be reasonably contested. Even for social 
220. Mark A. Bross. The Impact of Ornelas v. U.S. on the Appellate Standard of Re-
l'ie><· Under the Fourth Amendment. 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 871, 876-77 (2007) (arguing 
that the trial court in general is in a superior position to evaluate fact and implying that 
appellate resources are not sufficient to the task). Alternately. our judicial system assigns 
trial courts superior capacities to find adjudicative facts to achieve an efficient division of 
labor. See George G. Nelson. The Standard of Review in Title VII Disparate-Treatment 
Actions. 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1481. 1485-86 (1983). 
221. C(. Christopher Onstott, Judicial Notice and the Law's "Scientific" Search for 
Trwh. 40 AKRON L. REV. 465 (2CXl7) (discussing various problems with taking judicial 
notice without evidence). 
222. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 
223. Fed. R. Evid. 201(e). 
224. The Advisorv Committee noted the disagreement in the legal literature on 
whether a party should be able to rebut legislative facts of which the Court takes judicial 
notice. but declined to take a position given the wide discretion judges have in the area 
of legislative facts. Fed. R. Evid. 201 Advisory Committee Note. Subdivision (g) ("Am-
ple protection and flexibility are afforded by the broad provision for opportun:ty to be 
heard on request ... "). 
225. The lower court followed this approach in Reno by having the parties stipulate 
to undisputed facts concerning the internet so that the court could focus on the disputed 
legislative facts at issue. See id. at 849 n.2 (noting that the lower court's findings included 
··3~56 paragraphs of the parties' stipulation and 54 findings based on evidence received in 
open court"). 
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facts for which judicial notice is taken, parties should be given an 
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial no-
tice. 
Two phenomena of special relevance to evidence about so-
cial facts should be noted. While statistical evidence only com-
prises a portion of the objective evidence required for the analy-
sis of social facts, it may comprise an increasing portion of that 
evidence. Because of ever more powerful computers, social sci-
entists are able to father more data and analyze it more deeply 
than ever before.22 Courts should be able to take advantage of 
this trend, because adversaries on both sides of a salient factual 
question will have every incentive to produce the best experts 
and the latest statistical data. It is true that lower courts can 
make best use of such evidence only as they become sophisti-
cated consumers of statistics, including the regression analyses 
that dissect social science evidence. But just as judges in antitrust 
case have become more sophisticated over time in dealing with 
complex economic arguments,227 there is no reason that judges 
cannot attain a commensurate level of sophistication with statis-
tics. The alternative is to find social facts implicitly through intui-
tion and hunches, because as we have shown, in many cases so-
cial fact-finding is called for by constitutional doctrine. The 
latter course reduces the accuracy of social fact-finding and the 
legitimacy of constitutional decisions. 
Second, the district court should not directly rely on testi-
mony heard by Congress, but require that such evidence be in-
troduced according to the usual judicial procedures. While it 
may seem duplicative for the same experts who testified in Con-
gress to testify again in court about the same legislation, judicial 
procedures are different from those used in Congress, and, as 
discussed above, often make for greater accuracy. For instance, 
judicial procedures allow for cross examination, something that 
might have been useful in cases like U.S.R.R. Retirement Board 
v. Fritz, where Congress was essentially deceived by the Rail-
road Retirement Board's expert. 22H Requiring the application of 
226. McGinnis. supra note 158. 
227. See Peter J. Hammer. Antitrusr Beyond Competition: Market Failures. Total 
Welfare, and the Challenge of lntramarket Second-Best Tradeof(s. 98 MICH. L. REV. 849. 
917-18 (2000) (observing that the sophistication of analysis and receptivity of courts to 
economic arguments has increased). 
228. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz. 449 U.S. 166. 192-93 (1980) 
(Justice Brennan dissenting and arguing that the record indicates Congress was deceived 
into thinking employees would not lose benefits): see also Dennis Caraher. Constitutional 
Law- The Rational Basis Test Becomes Less Rational- U.S. R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz 
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judicial procedures and standards to evidence originally gath-
ered in Congress will avoid 'on the record' review and become a 
hallmark of the independence of judicial fact-finding. 
2. De Novo Review by Appellate Courts 
Appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, generally 
defer to lower courts' findings of adjudicative fact in all constitu-
tional cases except defamation cases covered by the First 
Amendment. 229 Appellate courts, however, generally and the 
Supreme Court in particular have been less express about their 
stance toward what we have called the social fact-finding of 
lower courts. They generally do not defer but sometimes suggest 
that such findings deserve deference.230 
While appellate courts should defer to findings of adjudica-
tive facts by lower courts, they should review social facts de 
novo, because findings of social facts, unlike findings of adjudi-
cative facts, create precedents for future cases no less than legal 
interpretations.231 Thus, if social fact determinations by lower 
courts were insulated from full review, lower courts rather than 
appellate courts would have the final say in establishing the law 
in a wide range of cases. Moreover, the evidence probative of 
social facts more likely involves statistical and other general data 
rather than the kind of personal testimony for which determina-
tions of credibility are essential. As a result, lower courts possess 
less of a comparative advantage from observation of witnesses. 
Of course, facts do not come labeled "adjudicative" on the 
one hand or "social" or "legislative" on the other. Courts must 
look to the function those facts play in the legal system to clas-
sify them properly. If the facts at issue are specific to the parties 
in the case, the appellate courts should review them under the 
deferential standard applicable to adjudicative fact-finding.m If 
they govern factual issues of more general scope, such as the 
& Schweiker v. Wilson. 4 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 429. 436--37 (1981-1982) (discussing how 
legislative history shows that Congress was deceived). 
229. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States. 466 U.S. 485 (1984). 
230. Compare Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp .. 450 U.S. 662. 674 & n.16 
(1981) (dormant commerce clause case appearing to defer to findings of district court 
and faulting the dissent for "ignor[ing] the findings of the courts below and rel[ying] on 
largely discredited statistical evidence."), with Dunagin v. City of Oxford. 718 F. 2d 738. 
748 n.8 (5th Cir. 1983) (reviewing Supreme Court precedents on legislative facts and 
finding that district court's conclusions should not receive deference). 
231. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and 
Establishing Social Science in Law. 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477.495 (1986). 
232. /d. 
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question of whether a specific protocol will safeguard children 
from indecency on the Internet or whether partial-birth abor-
tions are ever medically necessary, they function as social au-
thority. As a result, appellate courts should review such deter-
minations de novo in the same way as they review without 
deference the legal interpretations of lower courts.233 The oppo-
site conclusion would lead to the absurd result that a single dis-
trict court judge's findings of legislative fact would constrain the 
Supreme Court in a constitutional determination.234 
We do have a model that helps to make clear that appellate 
review of a factual record made by others can work. The Admin-
istrative Procedure Act contemplates a process for the creation 
of agency rules through formal rather than informal review.m In 
formal review the agency assembles a factual record though trial 
type procedures, including the application of evidentiary rules 
and cross-examination.230 The courts then review the whole re-
cord to see if the rule has factual support.237 It is true that courts 
do so on a "substantial evidence standard,"238 but changing that 
standard to de novo review would not change the basic division 
of labor between the record creating and record reviewing insti-
tutions. 
To be sure, creating a record and then subjecting it to de 
novo review will create substantially more work for courts. But 
the alternative to more labor is either more inaccuracy (if the 
lower courts do not compile a record with trial-type procedures) 
or more arbitrariness (if appellate courts do not engage in de 
novo review). The additional work does have another advan-
tage: it will encourage the Supreme Court to think seriously 
about the extent it wants constitutional jurisprudence to depend 
on social facts rather than formal rules. 
233. /d. at 491. 
234. See Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F. 3d 857, 883-85 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner. J., dis-
senting) ("Consistent deference in this pair of cases would lead to an inconsistent re-
sult-the upholding of one statue and the condemnation of its sister .... [A]n issue of 
legislative fact ... is not to be cabined by facts determined in an adjudicative hearing."). 
235. 5 u.s.c. §§ 556-57 (1987). 
236. See Richard B. Stewart. U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global Adminis-
trative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63. 74 (2005) (describing the trial type model of 
formal review). 
237. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2) (A) 
238. /d. 
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3. Remand for further factual findings 
While appellate courts should review the record de novo in 
determining social facts, they should endeavor not to use evi-
dence outside the record made by the lower courts. Relying on 
evidence outside the record is unfair to parties who have no 
chance to rebut the evidence that the appellate court makes dis-
positive. For the same reason, relying on evidence outside the 
record undermines the accuracy of the social fact-finding which 
it establishes. Thus, appellate courts' reliance on the factual re-
cord of their own creation erodes the distinctive advantages that 
the judiciary has vis-a-vis Congress in social fact-finding. 
The straightforward way to avoid these costs is for the ap-
pellate court to remand the case to the lower court for consid-
eration of a dispositive factual issue that the appellate court be-
lieves was missed or for reconsideration of an issue which, in the 
view of the appellate court, needs further evidentiary vetting. 
Remands for further evidentiary hearings would not de-
prive appellate courts of their ultimate power to find the rele-
vant social facts. Parties dissatisfied with social facts found by 
the court below would always be able to appeal the case again to 
the higher courts. Of course, remands for additional fact-finding 
will cause delay in resolving a case. But that is true for remands 
on any issue. Delay is simply the price of more accurate and fair 
fact-finding, and given that social facts constitute precedents no 
less than binding legal interpretations, the additional cost of de-
lay to the particular parties in the case are likely to be out-
weighed by the advantages to society as a whole. Moreover, 
more frequent remands for social fact-finding will no doubt en-
courage parties and lower court judges to make a full record of 
all the evidence substantially relevant to dispositive facts for 
which the constitutional issue calls. Amici will also have incen-
tives to intervene at the trial court stage rather than wait for a 
Supreme Court case, because this new framework will prevent 
them from prevailing in the appellate courts by making eviden-
tiary claims in their briefs that their opponents have no opportu-
nity to rebut. 234 
239. One interesting question is whether amicus participation alone at the district 
court stage will provide the optimal kind of intervention to improve the lower court fac-
tual record. Permitting interested parties to introduce evidence and rebut the evidence 
introduced by others may improve the factual accuracy of lower court determinations. If 
so. the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure might considering giving 
judges the discretion to permit a stronger form of intervention than amicus participation 
for factual development. The same reforms should be encouraged at the state level. 
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The Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Carhart should have 
considered remanding the case to the lower court when it was 
determined that the government could prevail simply by show-
ing that there was uncertainty about whether partial-birth abor-
tions were ever medically necessary.240 The lower courts had fo-
cused on the related but distinct claim of whether partial-birth 
abortions were ever medically necessary.241 The Supreme Court 
resolved the former issue in part by deferring to Congress's judg-
ment and in part by assuming that there was genuine uncertainty 
beca_use of conflictin~,eviden~e on wh~ther a~>Ortions were ever 
medically necessary.-- But, m our view, this was error. The 
Court should not defer to Congress's fact-finding, and it simply 
does not follow that there is genuine uncertainty about an issue 
because there is some conflicting evidence in the record. The 
trial court could have been asked to resolve whether there was in 
fact genuine uncertainty. 
C. CHALLENG lNG SOCIAL FACTS PREVIOUSLY FOUND 
Tying judicial decisions to express findings of social facts 
opens those decisions to challenge as the world changes and so-
cial scientific knowledge progresses. Both factual changes and 
changes in information about the facts can cast doubt on social 
facts previously found. Some might consider such potential chal-
lenges a large cost of greater candor about the factual underpin-
nings of constitutional holdings because those changes may ex-
pose deficiencies in previous precedent, thereby undermining 
the stability of the constitutional order. We believe, to the con-
trary, that when constitutional doctrine is dependent on social 
facts, precedent should be open to reconsideration when those 
facts are seen to change. Courts have the doctrinal resources to 
prevent such reconsideration from being taken lightly or from 
undermining important social interests in reliance and stability. 
First, the alternative to reconsidering facts is permitting 
constitutional law to be built on falsehoods. This has very sub-
where lower courts often decide constitutional issues of legislative fact that are subse-
quently reviewed by the Supreme Court. See. e.g .. Simons v. Roper. 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 
2003) (finding that there was a national and international consensus against the juvenile 
death penalty and that the youth of juveniles make them less culpable for their crimes 
and more likely to be falsely convicted). 
240. See Gonzales v. Carhart. 127 S. Ct. at 1610. 
241. See Carhart v. Gonzales. 413 F. 3d at 791. 
242. See Carhart. 127 S. Ct. at 1638 (observing that "'zero tolerance"' adjudication 
would inhibit Congress's ability to act when differences of opinion exist and relying on a 
finding that "'there is uncertainty"). 
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stantial costs in and of itself. Policies built on false factual prem-
ises tend not to work well, and as the falsity of those premises 
becomes widely known, those decisions tend to discredit the in-
stitutions that adhere to them. A jurisprudence that fails to take 
account of changing facts is likely particularly damaging to an 
institution, such as the judiciary, whose power depends in large 
measure on its reasoning. It is subject to the devastating re-
sponse that John Maynard Keynes made to complaints about his 
changing his mind: "When the facts change, I change my opin-
ions. Pray, sir, what do you do?"243 
Second, a measure of stability can be maintained by placing 
the burden of proof on the party that wishes to challenge the so-
cial facts previously found in precedents. The Court itself has 
recognized that its precedent is open to challenge if one of the 
parties can show the relevant facts have changed. In Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court 
said that "West Coast Hotel [v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)] and 
Brown each rested on facts, or an understanding of facts, 
changed from those which furnished the claimed justifications 
for the earlier constitutional resolutions. "244 Although the 
Court's choice of West Coast Hotel as an example was somewhat 
problematic,245 the general point was clear: while the burden of 
proof was on those who wanted to challenge the factual under-
pinning of those precedents, they could be challenged in an ap-
propriate case. 
Finally, the Court always retains the option to retain a 
precedent whose factual underpinnings are discredited, so long 
as it can provide other reasons for its retention. For instance, re-
liance interests in some kinds of cases may overwhelm the con-
cerns about changing circumstances: it may be more important 
that the rule is irrevocably settled then that it be settled in ac-
243. Quotations of John Maynard Keynes, printed at http://www-history.mcs.st-
andrews.ac.uk/history//Quotations/Keynes.html 
244. 505 U.S. 833. 863 (1992) (citing West Coast Hotel v. Parrish. 300 U.S. 379 (1937) 
and Brown v. Bd. of Educ .. 347 U.S. 497,483 (1954)). 
245. The Court stated that "the Depression had come. and with it. the lesson that 
seemed unmistakable to most people in 1937. that the interpretation of contractual free-
dom protected in Adkins [v. Children's Hospital. 261 U.S. 525 (1923)]. rested on funda-
mentally false factual assumptions about the capacity of a relatively unregulated market 
to satisfv minimal levels of human welfare." Nothing in the West Coast Hotel opinion 
itself nor in the historical consensus about the Depression suggests that freedom of con-
tract jurisprudence led to the Depression. or establishes that a relatively unregulated 
market cannot satisfy minimal levels of human welfare. See Alan J. Meese. Will, Judg-
ment and Economic Liberty: Mr. Justice Souter's Mistranslation of the Due Process 
Clause. 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 3. 44-52 (1999). 
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cordance with the current facts. 24" But our framework for social 
fact-finding will force greater judicial candor about the reasons 
for retaining precedent. As we have stressed throughout this ar-
ticle, express attention to social fact-finding and its place in con-
stitutional doctrine will make for analytically cleaner judicial 
reasoning and doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
Independent de novo review of the social facts necessary to 
determine the constitutionality of legislation is the judicial 
stance that best coheres with the rest of the law. The judiciary 
takes an independent, de novo view of the law, regardless of 
whether Congress informally or formally offers its own opinion 
on a statute's constitutionality. We have shown that there are no 
analytical or functional differences between law and fact that 
militate against the judiciary undertaking a similarly independ-
ent view of social facts. Indeed, it is arguable that because of its 
life tenure and adversarial process the federal judiciary has even 
greater comparative advantages in the accuracy of its social fact-
finding than in the accuracy of its legal interpretations. And 
even if the judiciary had only distinctive strengths in social fact-
finding, the departmental structure of the Constitution would 
argue for an independent role in this regard no less than it does 
for an independent executive and legislative role in legal inter-
pretation. 
Independent de novo review of social facts also is a simpli-
fying doctrine that promotes the rule of law. We showed that 
claims that the judiciary should defer to congressional fact-
finding in a particular area are ad hoc and often result -oriented. 
Independent review, in contrast, is a principled stance applicable 
across the full range of law. To be sure, the evidence needed to 
support the constitutionality of legislation may vary depending 
on the area of the law in question. But the standard should be 
varied based on the legal doctrine that applies to the issue being 
decided, such as the relevant balancing test or level of scrutiny. 
Thus, if legislation in the economic area requires only a rational 
246. See Arkwright-Boston Mrfs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co .. 887 F. 2d 
437. 442 (2d Cir. 1989) (observing that certainty may reduce legal costs): Planned Par-
enthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey. 505 U.S. 833. 854-55 (1992) (stating that the Court 
considers reliance on a legal rule and its continuing effectiveness rather than simply any 
changed factual situation). The Court seems to take this approach in Dickerson when it 
stated that "'Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where 
the warnings have become part of our national culture."' 530 U.S. at 443. 
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basis, it will take a relatively small amount of evidence to show 
that that policy is rational. But the standard of review will not be 
chosen because of some implausible claim about judicial fact-
finding in economics but instead will derive from settled princi-
ples about the appropriate scope of judicial review for economic 
matters. 
Finally, a consistent stance of independent review should 
help the judiciary improve its own findings of social fact, regard-
less of whether Congress has expressly found facts. The judiciary 
independently finds adjudicative facts and has a well-developed 
framework for doing so. That framework can be applied with a 
few adjustments to the finding of social facts. The lower courts 
should be responsible for creating a factual record through an 
adversarial process, and the appellate courts, including the Su-
preme Court, should be confined to that record (and any further 
record created on remand) in its fact-finding. This framework 
will greatly improve the accuracy of judicial finding of social 
facts. 
Because of ever more powerful computers, social scientists 
are able to gather more data and analyze it more deeply than 
ever before. It is thus more important than ever before that the 
Court both take seriously its responsibility for assuring that leg-
islation has whatever factual predicate is constitutionally re-
quired and shape its procedures so that that factual predicate 
can be best assessed. 
